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OUT OF BALANCE: EXCLUDING EEOC
DETERMINATIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 403
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals revived the debate
surrounding whether trial judges have discretion to exclude from juries
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or the Commis-
sion)1 determinations on reasonable cause2 in employment discrimination
cases. In Barfield v. Orange County,3 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
decision to exclude an EEOC reasonable cause determination is best left
"in the sound discretion of the district court."4 The court expressly re-
jected' the view of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that EEOC determina-
tions are per se admissible in jury trials.6 The First, Third and Eighth
1. The EEOC was created in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1988). The EEOC is composed of five members, appointed by the Presi-
dent with the Senate's approval, for a term of five years. Id. § 2000e-4(a). The Act delegated
to the EEOC "the primary responsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful employment
practices as defined in [Title VII]." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2401. See infra notes 146-75 for a discussion
of the EEOC's role in the processing of employment discrimination charges.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). This section of Title VII directs the EEOC to
investigate a charge of employment discrimination filed pursuant to the Act. Id. The investi-
gation shall yield a finding of reasonable cause, or no reasonable cause, to believe the charge of
employment discrimination is true. Id. The EEOC's standard for finding reasonable cause is:
A determination of reasonable cause is a determination that it is more likely than not
that the charging party and/or members of a class were discriminated against be-
cause of a basis prohibited by the statutes enforced by [the] EEOC. The likelihood
that discrimination occurred is assessed based upon evidence that establishes, under
the appropriate legal theory, aprimafacie case, and if the respondent has provided a
viable defense, whether there is evidence of pretext.
Issuance of Cause Determinations, [1 Compliance Procedures], EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
1061 (Mar. 1988).
Findings made by the local offices of the EEOC are called "determinations," whereas
findings made by EEOC headquarters are referred to as "decisions." Agency Proceedings, 9
Empl. Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.) 92,536 (Nov. 19, 1990). The terms "determination"
and "decision" may be used interchangeably as their effect on the charging party and respon-
dent is the same. Id. For the purposes of this Comment, findings of both cause and no cause
shall be referred to as "EEOC determinations," "cause determinations," "reasonable cause
determinations," or "determinations on cause." See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the EEOC's investigatory process.
3. 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-6501 (U.S. fied Dec. 11, 1990).
4. Id. at 650.
5. Id.
6. See, eg., McClure v. Mexia Indep. School Dist., 750 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1985); Plum-
mer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 321-41 and
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Circuits are in accord with the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of the per se
view.7 The United States Supreme Court has yet to review this divisive
issue.8
EEOC determinations on reasonable cause are generally considered
admissible evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), 9 the pub-
lic records exception to the hearsay rule.'0 Likewise, there is little dis-
pute that EEOC determinations may be excluded for untrustworthiness,
as Rule 803(8)(C) expressly so provides." Rather, the conflict in the
federal courts centers on whether judges have the discretion to exclude
EEOC determinations based on the "balancing test"' 2 of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403.1' This balancing test requires trial judges to weigh the
accompanying text for a discussion of the Fifth Circuit rule, and see infra notes 304-20 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit rule.
7. See Smith v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 877 F.2d 1106, 1113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 406 (1989); Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344,
347 (8th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309-10 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1041 (1984); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 1977); Angelo
v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir. 1977).
8. See Smith v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 110 S. Ct. 406 (1989) (denying certiorari);
Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 469 U.S. 1041 (1984) (denying certiorari). Petition for certio-
rari was recently filed in Barfield. See supra note 3.
9. FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C). Rule 803(8)(C) provides for the admission of "[r]ecords,
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies.., in civil
actions and proceedings... [and] factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursu-
ant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness." Id
10. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39 (1976); McClure, 750 F.2d at 399;
Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309.
11. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C). But see infra note 201, which discusses the question of
whether the Ninth Circuit actually recognizes the untrustworthiness exception. See infra
notes 201-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of how a public record may be excluded
from evidence on the ground of untrustworthiness.
12. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R. EvID. 403, which requires courts
to weigh the costs and benefits of admitting proffered evidence, is commonly referred to as the
balancing test. See Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 814 (7th Cir. 1988) (Flaum, J., dissenting);
Jones v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 844 F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1092 (1989); United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983). But see Gold, Limiting
Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 59, 87-88 (1984),
where the author comments that,
The metaphor of the scales suggests that the court is to compare levels of prejudice
and probative value[;] ... [h]owever, usually the court must focus not only on the
effect of these inferences on accuracy, but also on the probability the jury will draw
one or both of those inferences. Making that probability judgment is not a matter of
balancing.
13. FED. R. EvWD. 403. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id
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probative value14 of proffered evidence against the dangers of unfair prej-
udice to litigants, undue trial delay and misleading or confusing the
jury." If the probative value is substantially outweighed by one of these
"dangers," judges have discretion to exclude the evidence. 6 An eviden-
tiary objection based on Rule 803(8)(C) is distinct from a Rule 403
objection. 17
A majority of the circuits that have considered the issue, exemplified
by the Barfield decision, accord trial judges discretion tb apply the bal-
ancing test on a case-by-case basis.18 In contrast, the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits maintain that none of the Rule 403 "dangers" can outweigh the
probative value of EEOC determinations. 9 Hence, these two circuits
have held that, absent untrustworthiness, EEOC determinations are per
se admissible evidence.2°
The per se admissibility approach adopted by the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits should be rejected for several reasons. First, although an objec-
14. Probative value has been defined as "a measure of the extent to which evidence may
contribute to a more accurate factual determination." Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitu-
tional Challenge to the Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WAsH.
L. REV. 289, 315 (1989).
15. FED. R. EVID. 403.
16. Id.
17. Ledford v. Rapid-American Corp., 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 312, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Rule 803(8)(C)... relates to hearsay exceptions and has nothing at all to
do with Rules 402 and 403.").
18. See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 293 and accompanying text. A disturbing trend in the federal district
courts has been adoption of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' per se approach without a probing
analysis of why this approach is preferable. See, e.g., Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 702 F. Supp.
509 (D.N.J. 1988) (EEOC determination admissible but court agreed to give limiting instruc-
tion due to "lingering potential for prejudice"); Strickland v. American Can Co., 575 F. Supp.
1111 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (EEOC determination admissible with limiting jury instruction); Harris
v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 537 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (EEOC determination admis-
sible but given no weight because it was issued in contemplation of litigation), afjfd in part and
reversed in part, 712 F.2d 1377 (1 lth Cir. 1983). Note, however, these district courts' apparent
uneasiness with the introduction of EEOC determinations--evidenced by the limiting instruc-
tions given to the juries. But see Ledford, 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 313 (EEOC determina-
tion inadmissible on Rule 403 grounds).
20. Although neither the Fifth nor Ninth Circuit decisions label their refusal to exclude
EEOC determinations under Rule 403 as a per se rule, other courts and commentators have so
described the analysis. See, e.g., Barfield, 911 F.2d at 649; Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori
School, 776 F.2d 150, 153 (7th Cir. 1985); Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309; Court Proceedings, 9A
Empl. Coordinator, supra note 2, at 98,453 (Mar. 21, 1988). Generally, denoting an eviden-
tiary rule as per se means that "the court's function is simply to determine whether the party
has offered a particular type of evidence for a particular purpose. If so, the rule applies to
exclude or admit the evidence without regard to the specific context of the case." Leonard,
The Use of Character to Prove Conduct! Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58
U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 14 n.71 (1986).
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tion to the introduction of an EEOC determination may be raised on the
ground of untrustworthiness,2 this objection is often not made2 2 and is
seldom successful. 23  When analyzing the trustworthiness of a public
document, trial judges are guided by the Federal Rules of Evidence to
focus on whether the findings were compiled in a timely fashion by
skilled and unbiased investigators, and whether the litigants had an op-
portunity to request a review of the findings.24 Courts tend to refrain
from a rigorous analysis of these factors, deferring instead to the EEOC's
administrative expertise. 2 Given the judicial reluctance to exclude
EEOC determinations for untrustworthiness, a Rule 403 objection takes
on increased importance to the party opposed to introduction of the evi-
dence. Denying a judge discretion to apply the balancing test, then, con-
stitutes an outright rejection of the objecting party's last chance for
excluding an EEOC determination.
Second, the legitimacy of the American legal system depends largely
on the public's belief that the dual interests of "truth and justice" are
being served.2 6 Proper application by judges of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, especially Rule 403, enhances public confidence in the system by
allowing the exclusion of evidence which may prompt inaccurate deci-
sion-making.27 Thus, when a trial judge is constrained by a per se rule
from excluding evidence which may cause unfair prejudice to the parties,
21. See, eg., Barfield, 911 F.2d at 650; Tulloss, 776 F.2d at 153; Abrams, 702 F. Supp. at
512.
22. In all of the following cases an objection to introduction of the EEOC determination
was raised on the ground of unfair prejudice, but not untrustworthiness: McClure, 750 F.2d at
400; Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1308-09; Plummer, 656 F.2d at 504; Angelo, 555 F.2d at 1176.
23. See, e.g., Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651 (no evidence presented of determination's untrust-
worthiness); Tulloss, 776 F.2d at 154 (determination excluded on ground of prejudice, not
untrustworthiness); Abrams, 702 F. Supp. at 512 (no showing of untrustworthiness of EEOC
determination).
24. FED. R. EvlD. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note; see Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167 n.l (1988) (these four not necessarily an exclusive list of factors to
consider on issue of public document's trustworthiness).
25. See Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505 (EEOC determinations, "prepared by professional in-
vestigators on behalf of an impartial agency," are highly probative); Blizard v. Fielding, 572
F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1978) ("findings by the EEOC are entitled to great deference by the
district court"); EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1338 (D. Del.
1974) (Congress did not intend courts to test factual basis for EEOC action), aftd, 516 F.2d
1297 (3d Cir. 1975).
26. Lewis, supra note 14, at 290.
27. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651; Lewis, supra note 14, at 290-91. The Honorable Henry J.
Friendly, while espousing a narrow view of the application of judicial discretion under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, nevertheless characterized the discretion principle as "entirely ap-
propriate" in the context of Rule 403. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J.
747, 782 (1982).
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the truth-seeking process is undermined.2"
Additionally, the directive of Rule 403,'giving trial judges discretion
to exclude prejudicial evidence when warranted by the circumstances,2 9
is flouted when appellate courts remove this discretion by imposing a per
se rule. As one commentator explained:
Rule 403 bestows upon courts the discretion to exclude evi-
dence even when the other rules of evidence suggest admissibil-
ity. Implicit in the creation of this discretionary power is the
assumption that truth and justice cannot be captured by mere
language, but require the intervention of human sensibilities.
On a more mundane level, Rule 403 recognizes that definite
rules based on past situations sometimes do not work in new
and unexpected contexts. The purpose of Rule 403 is thus to
advance accuracy and fairness through judicial flexibility.30
A per se rule of admissibility mandates an inflexible evidentiary result,
thereby failing to take into account any concerns posed by the specific
circumstances of the case at hand.31 Moreover, parties desiring to ex-
clude an EEOC determination may believe that a per se rule denies them
an opportunity to be heard on an issue which may be crucial in jury
decision-making.
32
Third, uniform application of the Rule 403 balancing test to EEOC
determinations might better serve Congress' goal of achieving equal em-
ployment opportunity.33 The EEOC is given broad authority, under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643' (Title VII), to investigate charges of
28. Gold, supra note 12, at 67; Leonard, supra note 20, at 12.
29. S. SALTZBURG & M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 160 (5th ed.
1990).
30. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial
Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 499 (1983).
31. Leonard, supra note 20, at 47.
32. Id. at 39.
33. Title VII is the cornerstone of federal civil rights legislation and has, as its goal, the
elimination of employment discrimination. Rose, Going Too Far or Just Doing Their Job: The
Double Bind Facing EEO and AA Officers, 6 LAB. LAw. 439, 443 (1990). During the legisla-
tive debates concerning passage of Title VII it was contended that:
In other titles of this bill we have endeavored to protect the Negro's right to
first-class citizenship. Through voting, education, equal protection of the laws, and
free access to places of public accommodations, means have been fashioned to elimi-
nate racial discrimination.
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty stomach.
The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if gainful employment is
closed to the graduate. The opportunity to enter a restaurant or hotel is a shallow
victory where one's pockets are empty.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEWS 2355, 2513.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
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employment discrimination a.3  The Commission's failure to conduct a
minimally adequate investigation not only compromises its statutory
duty to the charging employee, but may also jeopardize that person's
employment security.36 Nevertheless, courts have noted that EEOC
findings are, at times, self-serving,37 untruthful or only partially truth-
ful, 38 conclusory,39 or potentially prejudicial.' Making EEOC cause de-
terminations uniformly subject to exclusion on balancing test grounds
may prompt the EEOC to conduct more consistent investigations and
produce less conclusory findings.
This Comment examines the evidentiary question of whether trial
judges should have discretion to exclude from jury consideration an
EEOC cause determination based on the Rule 403 balancing test. The
Comment begins by setting forth the federal statutes employees generally
use when filing claims of employment discrimination. 41 Next, the Com-
ment explains the EEOC's method of investigating an employment dis-
crimination charge,42 the means used to issue a determination on cause,43
and how a litigant may seek to introduce or exclude an EEOC determi-
nation in federal court.' The Comment then analyzes the two ap-
proaches-the per se view and the discretion view-currently taken by
federal courts on whether EEOC determinations may be excluded from
jury consideration.45 The Comment concludes by advocating uniform
adoption of the view which accords trial judges discretion under the Rule
403 balancing test to exclude EEOC determinations from jury
35. Id. § 2000e-8(a).
36. Confidentiality of Complainant or Aggrieved Person in a Third Party Charge, EEOC
Compl. Man., supra note 2, 811 (Feb. 1988).
37. Smith, 877 F.2d at 1113.
38. Hilton v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 624 F.2d 379, 383 (lst Cir. 1980).
39. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988).
40. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 650-51.
41. See infra notes 47-139 and accompanying text. By filing suit based on an alleged viola-
tion of Title VII, an employee is entitled to a federal court trial based on federal question
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
42. See infra notes 140-72 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 181-291 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 292-381 and accompanying text. This Comment focuses on employ-
ment discrimination cases tried before juries. The question of whether EEOC determinations
are admissible evidence also arises in bench trials. See, eg., Nieves v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 598 F. Supp. 955, 964 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (EEOC determinations generally admissible
but court has "discretion to give them as much or as little weight as it deems appropriate
under the circumstances"); Harris, 537 F. Supp. at 721-22 (judge admitted EEOC determina-
tion but refused to give it any weight). However, the Rule 403 undue prejudice analysis is
more pertinent injury trials because jurors are less aware than judges of the "limits and vagar-
ies of administrative determinations." Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651.
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consideration."
II. FILING AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
IN FEDERAL COURT
Employees with an employment discrimination claim may seek re-
lief under a variety of statutes. By far the most commonly pled cause of
action47 is violation of Title VII s Some of the other federal statutes
upon which claims of employment discrimination are based include sec-
tions 198111 and 198350 of title 42 of the United States Code (sections
1981 and 1983, respectively), and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act" (ADEA). These are each distinct statutory remedies.
46. See infra notes 382-431 and accompanying text.
47. W. CONNOLLY, JR:, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY:
LAw, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 8 (1975).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
49. Id. § 1981. This statute was originally enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, pursu-
ant to the thirteenth amendment. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866). After ratification of the
fourteenth amendment the statute was reenacted, in 1870, to confirm Congress' constitutional
authority to pass the legislation. Ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870). Consequently, the
statute may be referred to as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or 1870, or as section 1981. B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 668 (2d ed. 1983). See infra
notes 94-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 1981.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. Although section 1983 does not specifically address employment discrimination, it does
provide a cause of action for enforcing constitutional rights under the equal protection clause
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. S.
SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, THE LAW OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY § 12.02[2],
[2][a] (1990). A section 1983 claim is only cognizable when the employer's involvement with
the state is sufficient to satisfy the "state action" requirement. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 49, at 678. This essentially means the state is involved in the challenged practice.
Id. This requirement has been deemed satisfied in employment discrimination suits involving
police and fire departments, public schools, colleges and universities, public hospitals and state
agencies. Id. at 678-79. As long as the state action requirement is met, section 1983 covers
discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion or national origin. Id. at 684-85.
The remedies available under section 1983 include compensatory and punitive damages,
as well as back pay and injunctive relief. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra, § 12.02[l].
Consequently, section 1983 is primarily used in the employment discrimination area when
legal damages are sought, or when the plaintiff has failed to comply with Title VII's procedural
requirements. Id. When seeking damages under section 1983, the employee has a seventh
amendment right to a jury trial, see U.S. CONST. amend. VII. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNA-
THY, supra, § 12.02[l].
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). The purpose of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) is "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
Apri 1991]
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Under Title VII there is no seventh amendment 2 right to a jury
trial, for the act provides only equitable remedies.5 3 Thus, it is when
Title VII is pled together with another statute affording the right to a
jury trial that the evidentiary balancing test issue becomes crucial.5 4 Ti-
tie VII is, in fact, routinely pled in conjunction with other federal causes
of action allowing a jury trial,55 so the issue of excluding an EEOC find-
ing is pertinent to many employment discrimination suits. To explain
the mechanics of filing a claim and the context in which the evidentiary
issue is raised, this Comment focuses on claims in which both Title VII
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." Id. § 621(b).
The ADEA protects only those individuals forty years of age or older. Id. § 631(a). Prior to
commencing a civil action, an aggrieved employee must file a charge alleging unlawful discrim-
ination with the EEOC. Id. § 626(d). The EEOC will investigate the charge, and attempt
conciliation. Id. § 626(a), (b). After sixty days, the employee may also file a federal civil
action. Id. § 626(c)(1). The employee is entitled to a jury trial in the civil action. Id.
§ 626(c)(2). For an excellent discussion of the ADEA, see S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY,
supra note 50, § 14.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment provides: "In Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Id.
53. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 167 (1981); Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 (1979); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The Civil Rights Act of 1990
would have given Title VII plaintiffs seeking compensatory or punitive damages the right to
demand a jury trial. See H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1990). Congress is currently
considering similar civil rights legislation. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991); see also
infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text. If the right to a jury trial is extended to Title VII
plaintiffs, the controversy over whether judges have discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence
403 to exclude EEOC determinations from juries becomes all the more important to resolve.
54. Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 651 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No.
90-6501 (U.S. filed Dec. 11, 1990).
55. W. CONNOLLY, JR., supra note 47, at 8; see, e.g., Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856
F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988) (Title VII and section 1981 claims); McClure v. Mexia Indep.
School Dist., 750 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1985) (Title VII and section 1983 claims); Briseno v.
Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1984) (Title VII, section
1981 and section 1983 claims); Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.
1981) (Title VII and section 1981 claims); Abrams v. Lightoller, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 509
(D.N.J. 1988) (ADEA claim). But see Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, 803 F.2d 1488 (9th
Cir. 1986), which distinguished an EEOC letter of violation introduced in an ADEA proceed-
ing from an EEOC cause determination in a Title VII action. In Gilchrist the court held that,
unlike a cause determination, a letter of violation may be excluded if its probative value is
outweighed by its potentially prejudicial effect on a jury. Id. at 1500. The court's rationale for
making this distinction is that a letter of violation constitutes an EEOC conclusion that a
violation of the ADEA has occurred, whereas in a cause determination the EEOC has only
found probable cause to conclude a violation of Title VII has occurred. Id. The Gilchrist
court contended that there is a higher degree of risk that a jury will be prejudiced by an EEOC
conclusion than by a "preliminary" finding and, consequently, EEOC letters of violation do
not warrant admission on a per se basis. Id
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and section 1981 causes of action are pled. 6
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress enacted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196487 to ad-
dress discrimination in employment relations.5 8 Its purpose is to assure
equality of employment opportunities59 by making it unlawful for em-
ployers to discriminate in hiring, discharge, setting compensation or
other terms, imposing conditions or granting privileges of employment
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." The vast
majority of employment discrimination claims are brought under Title
VII,61 although claims may also be filed pursuant to other applicable
state62 and federal statutes. 3
To achieve Title VII's goal of equality of employment opportunities,
Congress enacted an elaborate administrative scheme which favors coop-
56. Section 1981 was selected as an illustrative counterpart to Title VII because the vast
majority of employment discrimination claims allege racial discrimination. B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 290 (eighty percent of all employment discrimination claims
allege racial discrimination, according to 1980 statistics). Additionally, Title VII and section
1981 were the causes of action relied upon in several of the leading cases addressing the eviden-
tiary issue which is the focus of this Comment. See Barfield, 911 F.2d at 645; Briseno, 739
F.2d at 346; Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 734 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 469
U.S. 1041 (1984); Plummer, 656 F.2d at 503; Hilton v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 624 F.2d 379,
380 (Ist Cir. 1980); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1977).
57. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (1988)).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
59. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) ("The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of
Congress to... eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered ra-
cially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.").
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). That section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
61. W. CONNOLLY, JR., supra note 47, at 8.
62. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 741. In federal court, state claims may
be brought if they survive the test of pendant jurisdiction: the state claim must arise out of the
same common nucleus of operative fact as the federal claim. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966).
63. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48-49 ("The clear inference [from the legislative history] is that
Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions
relating to employment discrimination.").
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eration and voluntary compliance over litigation. 4 The EEOC is the
linchpin for facilitating this scheme.6" Prior to filing a Title VII claim in
federal court, an employee must file a charge of employment discrimina-
tion with the EEOC and receive notice of the right to sue.66 This proce-
dure was created to enable the EEOC to oversee the initiation of private
lawsuits and to subject the parties to attempts at conciliation.67
Title VII has been interpreted to create two types of discrimination
claims: disparate treatment and disparate impact.68 If an employer took
a challenged action because of an employee's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin, the case is one of disparate treatment.6 9 Proving an em-
ployer's intent to discriminate is critical to a successful disparate treat-
ment claim.7° A disparate impact claim, in contrast, focuses on the
discriminatory effect of an employer's conduct.7" Although an em-
ployer's conduct may appear neutral, a Title VII claim will lie if the
employment practice is discriminatory in application.72
64. Id at 44; see also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2404 ("Commission must endeavor to eliminate any
such unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.").
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1988).
66. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
67. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 1.041]. Given the backlog of em-
ployment discrimination charges it has been suggested that the EEOC's procedures serve more
as a waiting period than a means to achieve conciliation. Id.
68. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977).
69. Id. (Court defined disparate treatment as when "[t]he employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin."); see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 13 ("The essence of disparate treat-
ment is different treatment: that blacks are treated differently than whites, women differently
than men. It does not matter whether the treatment is better or worse, only that it is differ-
ent."); S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 1.01[1].
70. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although
it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment."). To prove
intent, the plaintiff is required to show that the employer's conduct was taken because of, not
in spite of, its discriminatory effect. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979),
aff'd, 445 U.S. 901 (1980).
71. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 1.01[1]. The Teamsters Court de-
fined disparate impact claims as involving "employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another
and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not re-
quired under a disparate impact theory." 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. The disparate impact theory
has been successfully used to force employers to abandon certain discriminatory practices,
such as the use of height and weight restrictions, and the use of aptitude tests which have only
a slight correlation to job performance. Shanor & Marcosson, Battleground for a Divided
Court: Employment Discrimination in the Supreme Court, 1988-89, 6 LAB. LAW. 145, 150
n.25 (1990).
72. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
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1. Disparate treatment
An employee claiming discrimination based on disparate treatment
shoulders the ultimate burden of proving that the employer's conduct
was intentionally discriminatory.73 Establishing the prima facie case,
however, is not an onerous burden.74 It is during this initial stage in the
litigation that the employee may seek to introduce an EEOC cause deter-
uination as evidence to bolster the prima facie case.75 If the employee
carries this initial burden by a preponderance of the evidence, an infer-
ence that the employer discriminated arises.76
The employer must then be given the opportunity to explain that the
conduct stemmed from a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose.77 The
employer's explanation of its legitimate reason "must be clear and rea-
sonably specific ' 78 so as to deter fictitious excuses. If both legitimate
and illegitimate factors motivated the employer's action, and the plaintiff
has shown that an unlawful motive was a substantial factor, then the
employer is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision absent the discriminatory
purpose.80
Finally, the employee retains the burden of persuading the fact
finder that the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual.81 As evi-
dence, the employee may introduce the employer's general policy and
practice regarding employment of a protected group,82 statistics concern-
ing the employer's general pattern of discrimination, 3 specific evidence
of the employer's treatment of the employee,8 4 or comparative evidence
showing the employer treated members of a protected group less favora-
73. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
74. Id. at 253. For example, the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination may be accomplished by showing that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected
class; (2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job the employer was seeking to fill;
(3) the plaintiff was rejected; and (4) the employer continued to seek applicants with plaintiff's
qualifications for the position. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
75. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258; Sumner v. San Diego Urban League, 681 F.2d 1140, 1143
(9th Cir. 1982) (EEOC reasonable cause determination, among other things, considered "am-
ple evidence" that plaintiff proved prima facie case of employment discrimination).
76. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
77. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
78. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
79. Id.
80. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989); Shanor & Marcosson, supra
note 71, at 147.
81. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
82. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
83. Id. at 805.
84. Id. at 804.
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bly than similarly situated majority group members.8 5
2. Disparate impact
Claims of employment discrimination may also be based on a dispa-
rate impact theory. The rationale supporting disparate impact claims is
that Title VII was enacted to remove discriminatory barriers to equal
employment opportunity and, consequently, even neutral practices
which have the effect of subverting this goal must be eliminated.86 Thus,
this basis for an employer's liability focuses on "practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation." '8
As with disparate treatment claims, the burden of proving discrimi-
nation remains with the employee at all times.88 To establish the prima
facie case, an employee must show that "each challenged practice has a
significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities" for persons
protected by Title VII.89 Employees may rely solely on statistical evi-
dence to satisfy this initial burden."
Once the prima facie case is met, the employer must produce evi-
dence that the employment practice was motivated by a legitimate busi-
ness justification. 91 To carry this burden of production, the employer
need only present evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.92
Even if the employer's rebuttal is successful, the plaintiff may still pre-
vail. The challenged practice will be regarded as a pretext for discrimi-
nation if the employer refused to implement less. discriminatory
alternatives that would serve its business goals equally well.9"
85. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 15.
86. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
87. Id. at 431.
88. Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atono, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Ward's Cove Packing Co., the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant
after the plaintiff proved a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 would have overruled Ward's
Cove Packing Co. and returned the law to the Griggs burden of persuasion rule. H.R. 4000,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1990).
89. Ward's Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 657.
90. Id. at 650 (The proper statistical inquiry is a comparison "between the racial composi-
tion of the labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs.").
91. Id. at 660. ("[T]o the extent that [our earlier decisions] speak of an employers' 'burden
of proof' with respect to a legitimate business justification defense,... they should have been
understood to mean an employer's production-but not persuasion-burden.").
92. Shanor & Marcosson, supra note 71, at 158-59.
93. Ward's Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 661. Courts may assess cost and other burdens
to determine whether a proposed alternative would be an equally effective employment prac-
tice. Id.
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R. The Civil Rights Act of 1866: Section 1981
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 186691 to give victims of
racial discrimination, especially former slaves, a federal remedy.95 Yet it
took until 1975 for the United States Supreme Court to proclaim defini-
tively that section 1981 applies in the employment context. 96 Since that
time, section 1981 has been a popular and effective remedy for employ-
ment discrimination based on race.97 Unlike Title VII, section 1981 of-
fers the advantages of exemption from administrative procedural
requirements,9" the seventh amendment right to a jury trial when legal
94. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866), reenacted by ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)). Section 1981 states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). The statute was enacted as part of a comprehensive package of civil
rights legislation to enforce the newly ratified thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments,
see U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50,
§ 12.01.
95. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 12.01. Section 1981 remedies for
racial discrimination are not limited to black persons. W. CONNOLLY, JR., supra note 47, at 3.
For purposes of section 1981, the term "race" denotes a characteristic understood by the Con-
gress of 1866 as ancestral or ethnic. St. Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611-
12 (1987) (Arab may bring section 1981 claim).
Section 1981 was construed for over a century to prohibit only governmental acts of dis-
crimination. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 12.01. Its reach, however, was
eventually extended to include acts of private discrimination. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1968). While the Jones Court held that section 1982 bars
private discrimination, the decision was considered to indicate that section 1981 also prohibits
private racial discrimination because the language of both sections is traceable to the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2383 (1989) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 12.01.
96. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
97. Player, What Hath Patterson Wrought? A Study in the Failure to Understand the Em-
ployment Contract, 6 LAB. LAw. 183, 184 (1990).
98. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 12.01[1][a].
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remedies are sought,99 and the potential for punitive damages. °° Section
1981, however, requires proof of intent to discriminate"1 and so excludes
claims based on disparate impact recognized by Title VIL"'2
1. Establishing an employment discrimination claim based
on section 1981
The United States Supreme Court has set forth a specific framework
for establishing an employment discrimination claim under section
1981.1°3 This framework essentially parallels the scheme for Title VII
claims." The plaintiff has the initial burden of proving, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination.105 Once this
burden is satisfied, an inference that the employer discriminated arises.
10 6
The employer then has the opportunity to rebut the inference by showing
that the conduct stemmed from a legitimate, nondiscriminatory pur-
pose. 107 The employee retains the burden to persuade the jury that the
employer's proffered reasons are pretextual.10 The employee is not lim-
ited to a certain means of persuasion." 9 For example, an applicant for a
99. Id. § 12.01[l][b]. The right to a jury trial attaches when an employee seeks compensa-
tory or punitive damages pursuant to section 1981. Id. The courts are split on the issue of
whether a section 1981 award of back pay constitutes legal or equitable relief for seventh
amendment purposes. Id. Compare Skinner v. Total Petroleum, 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th
Cir. 1988) (back pay is equitable or legal depending on whether plaintiff characterizes it as part
of reinstatement or as contract damages) and Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1142
(8th Cir.) (back pay constitutes legal remedy because calculation of damages for hours of lost
work is easily ascertainable), vacated on other grounds, 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981) with Lynch v. Pan Am. World Airways, 475 F.2d 764, 765 (5th
Cir. 1973) (back pay part of equitable remedy of reinstatement) and Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.) (back pay similar to equitable remedy of restitution), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
In contrast, Title VII remedies have been deemed solely equitable, thereby foreclosing the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 167 (1981);
Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 (1979). In fact, even an
award of back pay is considered a central part of Title VII's statutory equitable remedy rather
than legal damages. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 & n.21 (1976).
100. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2375 n.4. The section 1981 remedies potentially available in-
clude an award of back pay, compensatory and punitive damages, reinstatement and injunctive
relief. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 12.01[l][b].
101. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2376-77.
102. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 12.01[2][c].
103. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2378. See supra note 74 for an example of the elements needed to satisfy a prima
facie case of employment discrimination based on disparate treatment.
106. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2378.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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job or promotion may demonstrate the person selected was less qualified,
or may present evidence of past treatment by the employer. 110
2. Scope of section 1981 in the employment context
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,111 the United States Supreme
Court confined the availability of section 1981 remedies to discrimination
in the formation of an employment contract," 2 and to discrimination
which "infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing
[employment] contract rights."' 13 The Court focused on the "plain
terms"' 14 of the statute to justify foreclosing claims based on post-con-
tractual conditions of employment." 5 Additionally, the Court decided
against a broad reading of section 1981 for employment grievances given
the expansive reach of Title VII. 6 Indeed, the Court maintained that
the integrity of Title VII's procedural requirements depends upon a lim-
ited reading of section 1981.11
The plaintiff in Patterson, a credit union teller and file coordinator,
filed claims for racial harassment and failure to promote pursuant to sec-
tion 1981.118 In its findings, the Court first concluded that racial harass-
ment is outside the scope of section 1981 because it pertains to the
conditions of employment rather than the formation or enforcement of
an employment contract. 119 Then, on the promotion claim, the Court
held that "[o]nly where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity
for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer is
such a claim actionable under [section] 1981."'12o In keeping with its
literal interpretation of section 1981, the Court suggested that a finding
110. Id. (employee may present instances of employer's racial harassment or failure to train
her for promotions).
111. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
112. Id. at 2372.
113. Id. at 2373.
114. Id. at 2372.
115. Id. at 2374.
116. Id. at 2374-75.
117. Id. at 2375.
118. Id. at 2369.
119. Id. at 2374.
120. Id. at 2377. The Court noted, as an example of a "new and distinct relation," the
refusal of a law firm to accept an associate into partnership. Id. Another example of such a
promotion might be moving from an hourly to a salaried position. S. SHULMAN & C. ABER-
NATHY, supra note 50, § 12.01. One commentator, however, has suggested that it is practi-
cally impossible to envision a promotion which fails to satisfy the "new and distinct relation"
test because "by definition a promotion entails new duties, responsibilities, and loyalties, not to
mention a different, presumably higher, compensation." Player, supra note 97, at 194. The
only example of a promotion not meeting this test, the commentator notes, would be when an
employee receives automatic salary increases. rd.
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of a "new and distinct relation" requires the kind of promotion involving
the formation of a new employment contract. 121 The Court remanded
the question of whether the credit union's failure to promote the plaintiff
to the position of intermediate accounting clerk satisfied this standard.
1 22
In a forceful dissent, Justice Brennan lambasted the majority's "sup-
posedly literal reading of [section] 1981. " 123 He argued that the legisla-
tive history of section 1981,124 and Supreme Court decisions construing
the statute outside of the employment context, 125 support interpreting
section 1981 as a broad remedy for discrimination in contractual situa-
tions. Justice Brennan warned that limiting the reach of section 1981 in
the employment context may "have the effect of restricting the availabil-
ity of [section] 1981 as a remedy for discrimination in a host of contrac-
tual situations to which Title VII does not extend."
' 126
Several lower courts have broadly interpreted Patterson to restrict
the remedial scope of section 1981.127 Despite these setbacks, however,
section 1981 remains important in the litigation of employment discrimi-
nation claims. For example, still within the ambit of section 1981 are all
racially premised hiring decisions 128 and most racially premised promo-
tion decisions.129 Additionally, discharges motivated by a discriminatory
121. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2390 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("it is clear that in granting the freedmen the
'same ight... to make and enforce contracts' as white citizens, Congress meant to encompass
post-contractual conduct").
125. Id. at 2390 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2391 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TMON LAW § 3.2, at 329 (2d ed. 1988) ("[Tlhe focus of the majority's concern in Patterson ...
seems to be on the potential intrusion of an expansionist interpretation of [section] 1981 on
uniquely private associational or contractual relationships. [It] therefore implicates a sphere of
conduct far broader than employment discrimination.").
127. See, eg., Overby v. Chevron, USA, 884 F.2d 470, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1989) (retaliatory
discharge for employee's filing of EEOC charge not covered by section 1981); Snowden v.
Millinocket Regional Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 701, 706-07 (D. Me. 1990) (plaintiff may not sue
under section 1981 for breach of promise plaintiff relied upon in agreeing to form employment
contract); Greggs v. Hillman Distrib. Co., 719 F. Supp. 552, 554 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (section
1981 not applicable remedy for denial of promotion from sales manager to district manager);
Williams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 716 F. Supp. 49, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1989) (section
1981 does not cover retaliatory demotion claim even though filing of claim threatened em-
ployee's ability to enforce employment contract rights); see also Player, supra note 97, at 190
("[Miany lower courts seem to view section 1981 as protecting nothing more than discrimina-
tory hiring. These decisions are marked by surprisingly little analysis of either section 1981 or
Patterson.").
128. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372; Player, supra note 97, at 192-93.
129. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377; Player, supra note 97, at 194.
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purpose may continue to receive section 1981 protection. 130 Construc-
tive discharge claims, where hostile working conditions motivated by ra-
cial animus force an employee to resign, should also remain valid under
section 198 1.131 Finally, employers who retaliate against employees who
file charges of discrimination with the EEOC may still face a section
1981 complaint.
132
Congress attempted, in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1990,133 to
reverse the Supreme Court's narrow reading of section 1981.134 Included
in the Act was a revision of section 1981 which stated that "the right to
'make and enforce contracts' shall include the making, performance,
modification and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all bene-
fits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship."
' 135
President Bush vetoed the Act, however, claiming it was a "quota
130. Player, supra note 97, at 195-96; cf. Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., 110 S.
Ct. 1331, 1336 n.3 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (whether discriminatory discharge and
retaliation remain actionable under section 1981 is an open question); Jett v. Dallas Indep.
School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2709-10 (1989) (court assumed, without deciding, that discharge
motivated by racial discrimination remained cognizable under section 1981 after Patterson).
Compare Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 1990) (discriminatory dis-
charge remains actionable under section 1981) and Padilla v. United Airlines, 716 F. Supp.
485, 490 (D. Colo. 1989) ("discriminatory termination directly affects the right to make a
contract" so is actionable under section 1981) with Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appli-
ance Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1990) (discharge is post formation "breach of
contract" conduct not protected by section 1981) and Lavender v. V & B Transmissions &
Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805, 808 (5th Cir. 1990) (discharge amounts to post formation conduct
and so is not actionable under section 1981).
131. Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The
right to make contracts would be rendered virtually meaningless unless it encompasses the
right to be free from discriminatory deprivations of such contracts."); Player, supra note 97, at
201-05. But see Carroll v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 891 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir.
1990) (claim of constructive discharge involves terms and conditions of employment which are
not cognizable under section 1981).
132. Jordan v. United States W. Direct Co., 716 F. Supp. 1366, 1368-69 (D. Colo. 1989)
(demotion because employee instigated investigation of discrimination charge states section
1981 claim); Player, supra note 97, at 208-09. But see Overby, 884 F.2d at 472-73 (retaliatory
discharge for employee's filing of EEOC charge not covered by section 1981); Williams, 716 F.
Supp. at 51-52 (section 1981 not applicable to retaliatory demotion claim even though em-
ployee argued this impeded her ability to enforce her employment contract rights).
133. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
134. Id § 2(b). Section 2(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 stated:
The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil
rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions; and
(2) to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under Federal
civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for
victims of discrimination.
Id
135. Id § 12.
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bill." '136 The President's veto, which was politically controversial, 37 has
not deterred a renewed effort for civil rights legislation. 38 As the newly
proposed legislation makes clear that adoption of quotas is neither re-
quired nor encouraged, there is some optimism that the President will
sign the legislation this second time around.
1 39
III. USE OF AN EEOC REASONABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION IN
FEDERAL COURT LITIGATION
Charges of employment discrimination filed with the EEOC are sub-
ject to investigation so that the agency may determine whether there is
reasonable cause to believe the charge is true."4 Despite fairly compre-
hensive guidelines on how to conduct an investigation,141 the EEOC's
review of the charge may not always be completely thorough 142 or may
result in a conclusory finding.14 Nevertheless, parties litigating in fed-
eral court may attempt to introduce into evidence an EEOC cause deter-
mination to enhance their respective positions. Employees use a
determination of reasonable cause to support the prima facie case of dis-
crimination,1" and employers use a finding of no reasonable cause in
their defense against the charge.
1 45
136. Crying "Quotas" Is Crying Wolf, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1990, § 1, at 22, col. 1.
137. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) described the President's
veto as "a shocking affront to our nation's longstanding bipartisan commitment to equal op-
portunity." 4 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Jan. 7, 1991).
138. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). The newly introduced bill "largely returns to
an earlier version of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, eliminating some of the last-minute
compromises-such as a cap on damages-that supporters incorporated in an unsuccessful
attempt to obtain President Bush's signature last year." 4 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Jan. 7,
1991). In his State of the Union address, delivered January 29, 1991, President Bush stated
that: "Civil rights are ... crucial to protecting equal opportunity. Every one of us has a
responsibility to speak out against racism, bigotry and hate. We will continue our vigorous
enforcement of existing statutes, and I will once again press the Congress to strengthen the
laws against employment discrimination without resorting to the use of unfair preferences."
The State of the Union, L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
139. 4 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Jan. 7, 1991).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
141. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(a) (1990); Investigations, EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 2,
1 821-996 (Mar. 1988). See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text for a description of the
EEOC's investigatory process.
142. EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1099 (6th Cir. 1984); Angelo v. Bacharach
Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir. 1977).
143. Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1041 (1984).
144. See, eg., Summer v. San Diego Urban League, 681 F.2d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 1982)
(EEOC reasonable cause determination considered part of "ample evidence" that plaintiff
proved prima facie case of employment discrimination).
145. See, eg., Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 649 (1lth Cir.) (employer allowed
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The following sections describe the EEOC's process of investigation,
its method of determining whether reasonable cause exists and the means
a federal court litigant may use to have the cause determination admitted
to or excluded from evidence.
A. The EEOC Investigation
An employee who files a charge of employment discrimination with
the EEOC initiates a multi-step process designed to investigate and,
hopefully, resolve the claim.146 First, the charge is evaluated to deter-
mine if it contains the necessary elements. 47 Second, an Equal Opportu-
nity Specialist (EOS) is assigned to the charge and arranges for either an
to introduce EEOC finding of no reasonable cause as part of defense against claim of racial
discrimination), petition for cert filed, No. 90-6501 (U.S. filed Dec. 11, 1990); Briseno v. Cen-
tral Technical Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344, 347 (8th Cir. 1984) (employer sought
to introduce EEOC finding of no reasonable cause in its defense, but district court excluded it).
To the employee's chagrin, in Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1983), the employer used
an EEOC finding of cause to its advantage. The determination included a statement by the
EEOC investigator that the person ultimately hired by the employer was more knowledgeable
than the applicant who was passed over and who subsequently sued under Title VII and sec-
tion 1981. Id. at 1321. Based on this evidence, the court agreed with the employer that it had
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its hiring decision. Id
146. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984). The purpose of filing a charge is to
"place the EEOC on notice that someone... believes that an employer has violated the title."
Id. at 68. The parameters of the investigation are as follows:
The investigation of a charge shall be made by the Commission, its investigators, or
any other representative designated by the Commission. During the course of such
investigation, the Commission may utilize the services of State and local agencies
which are charged with the administration of fair employment practice laws or ap-
propriate Federal agencies, and may utilize the information gathered by such author-
ities or agencies. As part of each investigation, the Commission will accept any
statement of position or evidence with respect to the allegations of the charge which
the person claiming to be aggrieved, the person making the charge on behalf of such
person, if any, or the respondent wishes to submit.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(a). See Interviews, EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 2, 7 821-832 (Mar.
1988) for EEOC investigation and interviewing techniques; Subpoenas, id 77 851-863 (Mar.
1988) for the means used by the EEOC to obtain evidence by subpoena; and Investigator's
Memorandum and Case Activity Documentation, id. %% 991-996 (Mar. 1989) for discussions of
how an EEOC supervisor should review the investigation plan.
147. B. SCHLEI & P. GROssMAN, supra note 49, at 939. Title VII requires that charges "be
in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as
the Commission requires." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). The EEOC refined this directive by
mandating that charges contain: (1) the full name, address and telephone number of the
charging party; (2) the full name, address and telephone number of the party charged; (3) a
clear and concise statement of the facts, including the pertinent dates, constituting the alleged
unlawful employment practices; (4) the number of employees working for the employer; and
(5) whether a state or local proceeding has been initiated on the same charge. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.12(a) (1990). The EEOC allows technical deficiencies in the charge to be amended. Id.
§ 1601.12(b).
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office or telephone interview with the employee. 14' The interview is in-
tended to establish the nature and scope of the charge149 and to dismiss
charges which fail to warrant further investigation. 150 Next, a fact-find-
ing conference may be held, attended by the employee, the employer and
the EOS.15 ' This conference is primarily conducted to elicit all facts, to
discuss the issues thoroughly and to pursue the possibility of settle-
ment.15 Based on this conference, the EOS has discretion to facilitate a
settlement or recommend a cause or a no cause determination. 153 Fi-
nally, unresolved charges requiring further review are scheduled for
investigation.
1 5 4
The EEOC has authority to conduct a comprehensive investiga-
tion.1 5  The scope of the investigation is only confined to discovering
evidence "relevant to the charge under investigation."1 5 6 The relevance
threshold is not difficult to meet, for it is interpreted to allow the EEOC
access to "virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations
against the employer." 157 To facilitate the investigation, Title VII allows
148. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 939.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 940.
151. Id. at 948. EEOC regulations provide:
The Commission may require a fact-finding conference with the parties prior to a
determination on a charge of discrimination. The conference is primarily an investi-
gative forum intended to define the issues, to determine which elements are undis-
puted, to resolve those issues that can be resolved and to ascertain whether there is a
basis for a negotiated settlement of the charge.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(c).
152. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 948.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 948-49.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988). The EEOC is considered best able to determine the
viability of an employment discrimination charge given its access to general statistics on em-
ployment patterns. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 69.
Title VII also authorizes the EEOC to enter into written agreements with certain qualified
state and local agencies so as to avoid duplicating charge processing efforts. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-8(b). These contracts are known as work sharing agreements. B. SCHLE1 & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 942. A work sharing agreement specifies which agency is to
handle the investigation of a charge. Id If a state or local agency is assigned to investigate,
the EEOC is directed by Title VII to "accord substantial weight to [its] final findings" when
making its own determination on cause. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988). Depending on the capa-
bility of the agency assigned to handle the charge, this mandated deference to state and local
agency investigations may detract from the probative value of an EEOC cause determination.
At the very least, it underscores the importance of applying the Rule 403 balancing test on a
case-by-case basis. For a further discussion of the scope and use of work sharing agreements,
see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 942 n.79 and Relationship with State Fair
Employment Practices Agencies, EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 2, 11 281-288 (Feb. 1988).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a).
157. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 68-69.
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the EEOC to examine and copy evidence in the employer's possession5 8
and to subpoena evidence and witnesses."i 9 The EEOC may also send
out questionnaires as a means of information-gathering." 6 Generally,
however, on-site investigations are not conducted. 16 '
Despite this broad investigative power, the EEOC does not always
conduct a thorough review of the charge prior to issuing a determination
on cause. 162 Yet it seems evident that if an investigation is inadequate, a
determination based on that investigation lacks credence. As one court
noted, "EEOC determinations are not homogenous products; they vary
greatly in quality and factual detail."'16 Determinations may be highly
conclusory,' 64 and they may not even reflect the investigator's true as-
sessment of the validity of the charge.'
65
The EEOC is seldom rebuked for inadequacies in its investigatory
process, for the scope of an investigation is considered within the discre-
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a).
159. Id. § 2000e-9. The EEOC authorizes subpoenas to require the attendance and testi-
mony of witnesses, the production of evidence including books, records, correspondence or
other documents, and access to evidence for examination and reproduction. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.16(a)(1), (2), (3) (1990); see also EEOC v. Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d 244, 251 (8th
Cir. 1983) ("EEOC may issue an administrative subpoena for information relevant and neces-
sary to a determination of reasonable cause even though the subpoena may also provide addi-
tional incentive for the respondent to settle the charge."), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
160. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 961.
161. On Site Investigation, EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 2, 11 901-907 (Mar. 1988).
162. The EEOC initiated a procedure for reviewing no'cause determinations because it grew
concerned that some investigations were perceived as inadequately conducted. EEOC Policy
Statement on No Cause Findings, [2 Laws & Regulations] EEO Compl. Man. (P-H) 81,921
(Dec. 15, 1986). In its policy statement, the EEOC noted it "is concerned that occasionally a
charging party may have been incorrectly denied complete access to the Commission's law
enforcement mechanisms due to deficiencies in the investigative phase of the charge pro-
cess .... [W]e must assure ourselves that our no cause findings do not result from a flawed
investigative process." Id. This review procedure is implemented through regulations codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1990).
For example, investigators have been accused of limiting the review to an examination of
the information submitted by the parties rather than conducting an independent assessment.
Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 651 (11th Cir.) (EEOC determination of no reason-
able cause admitted even though employee claimed investigator only reviewed information
submitted by employer), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-6501 (U.S. filed Dec. 11, 1990); EEOC
v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1099 (6th Cir. 1984) (district court's reliance on magistrate's
recommendation of summary judgment for employer because EEOC investigation composed
only of reviewing employer's affirmative action guidelines prior to issuing cause determination
held erroneous on appeal).
163. Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1041 (1984); accord Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori School, 776 F.2d 150, 153 (7th Cir. 1985);
Hilton v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 624 F.2d 379, 383 (1st Cir. 1980).
164. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309.
165. Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d at 247 (determination of cause rendered despite EEOC
investigator's acknowledgment that claim had no validity).
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tion of the EEOC."' Courts tend to accord the EEOC great deference
concerning what constitutes a sufficient investigation. 167 Justifying this
deference, one court maintained that:
The EEOC is not required... to conduct a full-scale, almost
adversarial investigation that would run down every lead and
confront every fact relevant to the charge. If that were the
case, there would be little need for a trial on the merits of an
allegation of unlawful job discrimination. 6 '
Judges are also resistant to prolonging the length of a trial by al-
lowing an inquiry into the sufficiency of an investigation. 169 Conse-
quently, the inadequacy of an EEOC investigation may not serve as the
basis for dismissing a discrimination claim.1 70 Nor may a party disgrun-
tled with an investigation seek a remedy directly against the EEOC, for
Title VII provides no express remedy 17 ' and the courts are unwilling to
imply a remedy into the statute.'
72
166. Keco Indus&, 748 F.2d at 1100; EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 937, 940 (D. Ga. 1980).
167. See, e.g., Blizard v. Fielding, 572 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1978) ("findings by the EEOC
are entitled to great deference by the district court"); EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1338 (D. Del. 1974) (Congress did not intend courts to test factual
basis for EEOC determination), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975); see also 1 C. SULLIVAN,
M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINAnON § 12.2.4 (2d ed. 1988) (defer-
ence to EEOC findings appropriate for three reasons: (1) de novo federal trial serves as review
of EEOC determination; (2) abbreviated EEOC investigation frequently sufficient to make rea-
sonable cause decision; and (3) inquiry into investigation may expose employees who have
assisted EEOC to retaliation). But see Hicks v. ABT Assoc., 572 F.2d 960, 966 (3rd Cir. 1978)
(presumption of regularity of EEOC investigation may be rebutted by showing EEOC investi-
gator never contacted employee and employee did not know investigation was proceeding until
receiving final determination of no cause by mail); EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp.
787, 794 (D. Md. 1974) (court may examine whether EEOC complied with its investigatory
procedures in reaching reasonable cause determination).
168. EEOC v. American Mach. & Foundry, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1634, 1640
(D. Pa. 1976).
169. Tulloss, 776 F.2d at 154; Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1100.
170. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1100; EEOC v. Albertson's Inc., 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1895, 1895 (D. Or. 1988); Sears Roebuck & Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
939-40. But see EEOC v. King's Daughters Hosp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 484, 489-
90 (D. Miss. 1976) (summary judgment for employer granted where EEOC failed to investi-
gate charging employee's lack of qualifications for position she applied for).
171. McCottrell v. EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir. 1984); Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311,
313 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953 (1984).
172. McCottrell, 726 F.2d at 351-52; Ward, 719 F.2d at 313; Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d
679, 682 (7th Cir. 1979); Francis-Sobel v. University of Me., 597 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979); Gibson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 579 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979).
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B. The Standard for Finding Reasonable Cause
Ultimately, an EEOC investigation results in a finding of reasonable
cause, or no reasonable cause, to believe that an employee's charge of
discrimination is true.173 The EEOC standard for a finding of reasonable
cause is a "good or even prospect of establishing the alleged violation"
from the information provided in the investigation fle. 7 4 This is known
as the "litigation-worthy" standard.
17
The purpose for issuing a cause determination is to put the employer
on notice of the EEOC's findings. 176 Should attempts at conciliation of
the charge fail, the employer is also on notice that a lawsuit may be
filed. 177 A finding of reasonable cause, however, is not a prerequisite to
filing an employment discrimination claim in federal court. 171 In fact, an
employee may proceed to trial even if the EEOC determines that no rea-
sonable cause exists to believe the discrimination occurred. 17  This is
allowed because, regardless of the outcome of an EEOC investigation, a
plaintiff's claim in federal court is entitled to de novo consideration.'1 0
173. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 949, 962. After investigating the charge,
the EOS will make a recommendation of reasonable cause or no reasonable cause to the Re-
gional Attorney. The Regional Attorney will then discuss the file with the EEOC District
Director, who will issue the appropriate determination or return the file for further investiga-
tion. Id. at 949-50. This delegation of authority in issuing cause determinations is allowed
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(d) (1990). These procedures are set forth in Issuance of
Cause Determinations, EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 2, 1061-1084 (Mar. 1988).
174. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 109 (2d ed. Supp. 1984). The determina-
tion "is based on, and limited to, evidence obtained by the Commission and does not reflect
any judgment on the merits of allegations not addressed in the determination." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.21(a) (1990).
175. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 109 (2d ed. Supp. 1984).
176. EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. St. Anne's Hosp.
of Chicago, 664 F.2d 128, 131 (7th Cir. 1981).
177. EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 595 (1981).
178. Id.; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
179. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 465 & n.3 (1982); Barfield v. Orange
County, 911 F.2d 644, 649 (1 1th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-6501 (U.S. fied Dec. 11,
1990).
180. Associated Dry Goods, 449 U.S. at 595. De novo consideration means that the plaintiff
is entitled to a fresh consideration of the facts surrounding the charge, rather than being con-
fined to the administrative record. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 862 n.37, 863
(1976). Therefore, an EEOC determination is in no way dispositive in a federal trial on the
issue of whether discrimination has occurred. Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d
502, 504 (9th Cir. 1981); Blizard v. Fielding, 572 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1978); Smith v. Univer-
sal Servs., 454 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc); EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1338 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975); see also
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 474 ("the requirement of a trial de novo in federal district court following
EEOC proceedings was added primarily to protect employers from overzealous enforcement
by the EEOC").
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C. Introducing the EEOC Determination as Evidence
Title VII does not address whether an EEOC determination is ad-
missible evidence in a federal trial.181 As the results of an EEOC investi-
gation are not binding in court,182 the purpose in introducing a
determination is to lend evidentiary support to either the employee's
prima facie case or the employer's defense to the charge. 83
An EEOC determination is hearsay evidence. 84 The fact-finding
process is conducted out of court by field investigators and the conclu-
sion, which is used to support or deny the alleged discrimination, is ren-
dered out of court by EEOC representatives. 8 5  Despite its hearsay
qualities, such a determination is presumed admissible evidence, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(8)(C).' 86 The rationale for this hearsay exception is that public re-
ports, prepared pursuant to a legal duty to investigate,187 are considered
sufficiently reliable. 18 Moreover, it would be impractical to have an in-
vestigator testify in court every time a litigant seeks to introduce the re-
sults of an official investigation."8 9
To come within the parameters of Rule 803(8)(C), a public report
must be composed of "factual findings." 19 0 An EEOC reasonable cause
determination constitutes an investigator's opinion as to the merit of the
discrimination charge. Arguably, then, EEOC determinations are not
admissible under the public records exception because they represent
181. Smith v. Universal Servs., 454 F.2d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1972); 3 C. SULLIVAN, M.
ZIMMER & R. RicHARDS, supra note 167, § 33.3.3.
182. 9 Empl. Coordinator, supra note 2, at 92,537 (Jan. 15, 1990).
183. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
184. Smith, 454 F.2d at 157. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declar-
ant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
185. Smith, 454 F.2d at 157.
186. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39 (1976); McClure v. Mexia Indep.
School Dist., 750 F.2d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 734 F.2d
1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1041 (1984); FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C). See gener-
ally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 316 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (discussion of hearsay nature of
investigative reports and trend toward admissibility).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5b (1988).
188.. Young, The Use of Public Records and Reports as Trial Evidence Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 117, 119-21 (1980). A court may be hesitant to
ascribe an improper motive to an agency's investigative efforts given that the agency's purpose
is to serve the public. See Ellis v. International Playtex, 745 F.2d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 1984);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 186, § 315, at 889 ('The impetus for this [public
records] exception is found in the inconvenience of requiring public officials to appear in court
and testify concerning the subject matter of their records and reports.").
189. Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
190. FED. R. Evm. 803(8)(C).
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conclusions, rather than facts.191 Yet the United States Supreme Court
foreclosed this type of challenge in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey. 92 In
that case, the Court held: "[P]ortions of investigatory reports otherwise
admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) are not inadmissible merely because
they state a conclusion or opinion. As long as the conclusion is based on
a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness require-
ment, it should be admissible along with other portions of the report."'
193
Thus, the party opposing introduction of an EEOC determination is
left with two main challenges.' 94 First, Rule 803(8)(C) expressly pro-
vides that an untrustworthy public document may be excluded. 9 An
affirmative showing of untrustworthiness undercuts the presumption of
reliability upon which the public records exception is premised. 196 The
second means of challenging the introduction of an EEOC determina-
tion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, is by proving that its
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."' 97 This challenge requires trial judges to weigh
the costs and benefits of admitting proffered evidence.' 9 The Federal
Rules of Evidence appear to support an application of this balancing test
on a case-by-case basis.' 99 Nevertheless, the federal courts are divided on
whether a judge has discretion to apply this balancing test to exclude an
EEOC determination from a jury.2 'o The following sections describe, in
191. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 186, § 316, at 890 n.7.
192. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
193. Id. at 170. The Court dispensed with the notion that the Congressional debates de-
manded a narrow interpretation of the meaning of "factual findings." Id at 166-67 & n.10. In
fact, the Court found that there was no indication from the advisory committee's comments
that opinions were meant to be excluded. Id
194. Young, supra note 188, at 120-21. The party opposing the introduction of the EEOC
determination has the burden of persuading the court to reject the evidence. Id at 131.
195. FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C); see Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167
(1988).
196. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 449.
197. FED. R. EVID. 403; accord Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 167-68.
198. McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 186, § 185, at 544-48.
199. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note; see also Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S.
at 167-68 ("safeguards built into other portions of the Federal Rules, such as those dealing
with relevance and prejudice, provide the court with additional means of scrutinizing and,
where appropriate, excluding evaluative reports or portions of them"); Hines v. Brandon Steel
Decks, 886 F.2d 299, 302 (1 1th Cir. 1989) ("public reports, otherwise admissible under Rule
803(8)(C), may nonetheless be excluded in whole or in part if the trial court finds that they are
either irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative"); MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
186, § 185, at 544.
200. Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 509, 512 (D.N.J. 1988). Compare Barfield v.
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more detail, evidentiary challenges based on Rule 803(8)(C) and Rule
403.
1. Exclusions based on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C)
Given the express caveat concerning untrustworthy documents in
the public records exception, there is little dispute that EEOC determina-
tions may be excluded on this ground.20 1 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that "a trial judge has the discretion, and in-
deed the obligation, to exclude an entire report or portions thereof-
whether narrow 'factual' statements or broader 'conclusions'-that she
determines to be untrustworthy."2 "2 Yet the burden of proving untrust-
worthiness rests with the party seeking exclusion,2 °3 for it is presumed
that public records are accurate and reliable. °4
Underlying this presumption of reliability is the belief that agency
officials will properly perform their duties,20 and that they remain ac-
countable to the public based on the results of their investigations.20 6
This view presupposes, then, that the investigating official relies on per-
sonal knowledge or unbiased information to prepare the report.207 To
put these assumptions to the test, four factors are most often used to
Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 650-51 (11th Cir.) (judge has discretion to exclude EEOC
determinatons on Rule 403 grounds), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-6501 (U.S. filed Dec. 11,
1990) and Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309-10 (judge has discretion to exclude EEOC determinations
on Rule 403 grounds) with McClure, 750 F.2d at 400 (EEOC determinations are per se admis-
sible evidence) and Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981)
(EEOC determinations are per se admissible evidence).
201. Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori School, 776 F.2d 150, 153 (7th Cir. 1985); McClure,
750 F.2d at 400.
Note that the Ninth Circuit appeared to adopt a per se rule of admissibility for EEOC
determinations. See Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505. Whether the court intended to foreclose un-
trustworthiness objections is unclear. For example, in a non-employment context, the Ninth
Circuit suggested that a public record might be excluded for untrustworthiness. In re Aircrash
in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir.) (Federal Aviation Administration report
admissible under public records exception where defendant failed to demonstrate report was
untrustworthy), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 277 (1989). Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit inter-
preted Plummer to mean that under no circumstance, untrustworthiness included, does a
judge have discretion to exclude an EEOC determination. Barield, 911 F.2d at 649-50.
202. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 167.
203. Masemer v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Del. 1989); In
re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1493, 1497 (D. Colo. 1989);
Young, supra note 188, at 131.
204. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 449; Grant, The Trustworthiness Standard for the Public
Records and Reports Hearsay Exception, 12 W. ST. L. REV. 53, 55 (1984).
205. Grant, supra note 204, at 56.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 57.
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assess trustworthiness:2°8  (1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the
investigating official's special skill or experience; (3) whether a hearing is
available; and (4) whether the agency had the motivation to conduct a
thorough and impartial investigation. 20 9
a. timeliness of the investigation
The amount of time which elapses between the filing of a charge and
the resulting EEOC investigation and findings may affect trustworthiness
in two distinct ways. Primarily, a timely investigation serves to minimize
reliance on stale evidence.21 0 An investigative report is considered more
reliable than a witness at trial whose recollection has dimmed.
2 11  Of
course, the force of this argument hinges on the assumption that a public
official will have the opportunity to investigate a charge fairly quickly.
2 12
Unfortunately, this assumption may often be unwarranted with respect
to an EEOC investigation. Swamped with backlogged charges, investiga-
tions are sometimes delayed for long periods of time.213 Meanwhile,
memories may fade and employees may either be discharged from or vol-
untarily leave their jobs.
Sometimes, however, the passage of time will support a determina-
tion's reliability. A long period of time between the filing of a charge and
208. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 167 n. 11. These four are not considered an exclusive
list of factors to consider. Id.
209. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note.
210. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 450.
211. Id. Title VII suggests that a determination be issued within 120 days of the filing of
the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). However, this is not a mandatory deadline. 9 Empl.
Coordinator, supra note 2, at 92,537 (Jan. 15, 1990). The EEOC's failure to meet the deadline
neither constitutes an actionable wrong nor has jurisdictional ramifications. Id.
212. Grant, supra note 204, at 82 n.147. A variety of factors will influence the amount of
time it takes the EEOC to issue a determination:
(1) the legal or factual complexity of the allegations; (2) the geography of the parties
in relation to the district office; (3) the resources in comparison to the case load at
that office; (4) the cooperation of both parties; (5) the skill of the investigator in-
volved in the charge; (6) the particular method of processing chosen by the EEOC;
(7) the willingness of the parties to settle prior to determination; and (8) whether the
charge must or will be processed first by [another] agency.
9 Empl. Coordinator, supra note 2, at 92,537 (Jan. 15, 1990).
213. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. RnV. 1121, 1150 (1989). Despite efforts to expedite the
processing of charges, there were 61,000 backlogged cases in 1987. Id. at 1157. By the end of
1987, 26% of all charges were still unreviewed after 300 days. Id. Additionally, the number
of charges filed with the EEOC may actually increase in response to the Court's narrowing of
the availability of section 1981 remedies in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363
(1989). Shanor & Marcosson, supra note 71, at 174; cf. EEOC v. National City Bank, 694 F.
Supp. 1287, 1291-94 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (EEOC's lengthy delay in beginning investigation
prejudiced employer in its ability to prepare defense and exposed it to greater potential
liability).
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the ultimate determination on cause may indicate that a thorough inves-
tigation was conducted.214 If there are many documents to evaluate or
witnesses to hear from, the passage of time, by itself, should not detract
from the trustworthiness of the results of a protracted investigation.2"'
b. special skill or experience of the investigating official
Trustworthiness is also measured, in part, by the degree of expertise
of the agency conducting the investigation.216 The greater the agency's
experience in conducting investigations, the more confident a court can
be that the investigating official formed accurate conclusions from the
evidence.21 7 It is possible, however, that even an agency experienced in
conducting investigations may at times act in a reckless or inexpert
manner.
2 18
A court may consider the experience of both the agency and the
investigating official when assessing trustworthiness.219 The essential in-
quiry is whether the agency as a whole, or the individual investigator,
qualifies as an expert under the evidence code.220 Litigants in employ-
ment discrimination suits may have a difficult time convincing a court
that the EEOC and its investigators are not specially qualified to gather
evidence. Indeed, the EEOC is described as an impartial agency 221 with
extensive resources and staff available for conducting investigations.
222
Its field investigators are, in fact, considered experts at uncovering dis-
criminatory practices.223 Consequently, the objecting party's only real
challenge to the EEOC's expertise, on which it may be difficult to prevail,
214. EEOC v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 81-84 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 469
U.S. 925 (1984); Masemer, 723 F. Supp. at 1021; Note, Admitting Opinions and Conclusions in
Evaluative Reports: The Trustworthiness Inquiry, 64 WASH. L. RPv. 975, 985 (1989).
215. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 451. But see Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97, 99
(2d Cir. 1973) (260-page investigative report, characterized as a "mish-mash of self-serving
and hearsay statements and records" neither reliable nor trustworthy).
216. Gentile, 129 F.1.D. at 452-53.
217. See Note, supra note 214, at 986.
218. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 453.
219. Id. at 452-53 (both government agency and agency's staff qualified to conduct investi-
gation into law enforcement misconduct).
220. Note, supra note 214, at 986 ("It would be anomalous to admit a report under a hear-
say exception when the preparer of the report would not be permitted to give the same testi-
mony in court as an expert witness."); see FED. R. EvID. 702, 703; see also Heard v. Mueller
Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972) ("Since it is within the sound discretion of the District
Court whether to accept an EEOC investigator as an expert witness, it would seem to be
within the same discretion whether or not to accept the EEOC's final investigation report.").
221. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505.
222. Smith, 454 F.2d at 157.
223. Id. (investigators are trained and experienced in seeking out discrimination in its vari-
ous forms); see also Mitchell v. Office of Los Angeles County, 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir.
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is that the EEOC staff investigator failed to carry out the EEOC's express
investigative procedures. 2 4
c. availability of a hearing
The availability of a hearing generally weighs in favor of a finding of
trustworthiness.225 Although a hearing does not guarantee trustworthi-
ness, it may ensure that findings are based on investigations in which
procedural safeguards were followed.226 Yet when interpreting this fac-
tor, courts have not required a full evidentiary hearing with cross-exami-
nation.227 Rather, findings are considered trustworthy as long as the
investigating agency complied with procedures228 allowing both sides the
opportunity to present their positions, and to reply to the opposing
position.229
Although EEOC determinations are rendered after fairly informal
proceedings,230 these proceedings are conducted pursuant to agency
compliance standards.231 An EOS gathers information in accordance
with EEOC investigation procedures.232 Moreover, the EEOC cannot
issue a finding that cause exists to believe discrimination occurred unless
evidence uncovered in the investigation meets the "litigation worthy"
standard.233 Opportunity for agency review of a no cause determination
exists. 234 Thus, unless a litigant can show that the compliance proce-
dures were not carried out, the EEOC's investigative process should sat-
isfy the hearing requirement.
1986) (EEOC determination sufficient to create triable issue of fact due to EEOC's expertise in
investigating employment discrimination claims), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 858 (1987).
224. See, eg., Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 453 (court refused to entertain objection that staff
members of state's criminal investigation commission failed to follow procedures after deciding
that commission itself qualified as an expert). But see EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F.
Supp. 787, 794 (D. Md. 1974) (court may examine whether investigators followed EEOC com-
pliance procedures).
225. Note, supra note 214, at 988.
226. Id.
227. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 268 (3d Cir. 1983); Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at
456.
228. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 455-56.
229. United States v. AT&T, 498 F. Supp. 353, 365 (D.D.C. 1980).
230. 3 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 167, § 33.3.3, at 284 n.3.
231. Investigations, EEOC Comp. Man., supra note 2, 821-957 (Mar. 1988).
232. Id
233. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the meaning of the
"litigation worthy" standard.
234. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1990).
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d. motivation to conduct an impartial investigation
This final factor may serve as grounds to exclude biased or inade-
quately investigated findings. 235 The primary focus here is on investiga-
tions conducted in anticipation of litigation.236 The EEOC may become
involved in Title VII litigation in two ways. First, the Attorney General,
on behalf of the EEOC, may elect to file a Title VII complaint237 against
an employer if to do so would serve the public interest 238 and conciliation
efforts have failed.239 The EEOC must issue a reasonable cause determi-
nation prior to the Attorney General filing suit.24 Arguably, then, this
determination will reflect the agency's interest in pursuing the employer's
compliance with Title VII. Second, the EEOC may attempt to intervene
in a Title VII suit initiated by a private party.241 Completion of the in-
vestigative process and issuance of a reasonable cause determination is,
however, not a prerequisite to EEOC intervention.242
Bias may also stem from partisan political or policy goals that an
investigating agency seeks to implement.24 3 The EEOC has been en-
trusted with no less a task than guiding the fundamental change of "the
patterns of employment discrimination that [have] become ossified in the
labor market. ' '2 4 EEOC investigators, charged with the responsibility of
ferreting out employment discrimination in all its various forms, 245 may
be biased246 or pressured into finding violations.247
235. Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 537 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (court
refused to place any weight on EEOC determination issued six months after suit filed because
it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and so lacked trustworthiness), aff'd in part and
reversed in part, 712 F.2d 1377 (1lth Cir. 1983); Grant, supra note 204, at 82 n.150.
236. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 457; Note, supra note 214, at 988.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1988).
238. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 1138.
239. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 469 (1982).
240. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 1142.
241. Id. at 1168-71.
242. Id. at 1168-69.
243. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 457; Note, supra note 214, at 989.
244. Chambers & Goldstein, Title VII at Twenty: The Continuing Challenge, 1 LAD. LAW.
235, 242 (1985).
245. Smith, 454 F.2d at 157.
246. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1257, 1301-
04 (7th Cir. 1988) (EEOC investigator, who also prepared reasonable cause determination,
"palpably" biased against Sears); see also Note, The Scope of Federal Rule of Evidence
803(8)(C), 59 TEX. L. Rnv. 155, 165-66 (1980) ("What appears invidious to an official may
appear innocent to a jury. The danger of confusion is especially great if the official is not
present to explain what he meant by his conclusion.").
247. EEOC v. Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d 244, 247 (8th Cir. 1983) (investigator issued
determination finding cause so as to facilitate settlement despite personal belief claim lacked
merit), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
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Despite the EEOC's apparent interest in Title VII litigation, courts
tend to refer to the agency as impartial.248 This may be because the five
Commission members, although selected by the President, must be con-
firmed by the Senate. 4 9 Additionally, no more than three of the Com-
mission members may be from the same political party.250 The
consequence of this apparent bipartisanship is that courts are reluctant to
exclude an agency finding unless specific evidence of bias is presented.2 1
Indeed, one court concluded that an agency's interest in its conclusions
goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence.2 52
2. Exclusions based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Assuming that a proffered EEOC determination is trustworthy, the
objecting party may still contend that it is improper evidence for jury
consideration. Trustworthiness means only that the EEOC determina-
tion is reliable enough to substitute for the in-court testimony of the in-
vestigating official. An EEOC determination will generally pass this
trustworthiness test if it is rendered after an investigation of the discrimi-
nation charge by a skilled, unbiased investigator. 25 3 Thus, a finding of
trustworthiness does not resolve the issue presented by a Rule 403 objec-
tion-will the proffered EEOC determination induce the jury to engage
in inaccurate decision-making?
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the evidence code's balancing test,
2 54
is the tool judges have for excluding evidence that may foster inaccurate
or unfair decision-making by a jury.255 Rule 403 requires the potential
costs of unfair prejudice, jury confusion and undue trial delay to be
weighed against the benefit of admitting an EEOC determination proba-
tive of the very discrimination charge at issue in the case.256 Evidence
may be excluded only if one of these factors substantially outweighs its
248. Gifford v. Atchison, T. & Sta. F. Ry., 685 F.2d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982); Plummer,
656 F.2d at 505.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1988). The legislative history of Title VII confirms that the
EEOC is supposed to be "bipartisan in character." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
28, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2355, 2404.
250. 9 Empl. Coordinator, supra note 2, at 91,341 (Oct. 15, 1990).
251. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 457; Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. at 1498.
252. Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. at 1498.
253. See supra notes 201-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors courts
look to in determining the trustworthiness of a public document.
254. FED. R. EVID. 403.
255. Leonard, supra note 20, at 12; S. SALTZBURG & M. MARTIN, supra note 29, at 160.
256. The balancing test is supposed to be applied in the context of the circumstances of a
particular case. Lewis, supra note 14, at 318-19; Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-
Law Approach to an Expert's Opinion About a Witness's Credibility Still Does Not Work, 55
BROOKLYN L. REv. 559, 588 (1989).
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probative value.257
EEOC determinations are generally described as highly probative
evidence on the issue of employment discrimination. 258 This description
seems somewhat overstated, however, given that a determination is
merely a preliminary finding that there is reason to believe there has been
a violation of Title VII, rather than a conclusive finding of a violation.
25 9
Yet courts point to the impartiality of the EEOC,26 the extensive re-
sources and staff it has available for investigations,261 and its highly
trained investigators as supporting the probative value of a determina-
tion.262 Merely because the EEOC has the capability of conducting qual-
ity investigations, however, does not mean its findings always reflect this
expertise.26a Moreover, juries may be particularly influenced by the
value of an official government report, and give it undue weight. 2 4
Thus, although an EEOC determination may pass the threshold test of
trustworthiness, it still may be improper for jury consideration. 265
Rather than excluding the evidence, a judge may instead attempt to
diffuse any potential prejudice by issuing a limiting instruction informing
the jury of the proper weight to accord the EEOC's finding.266 A limit-
ing instruction, however, may not always effectively protect the interests
of the party objecting to introduction of the evidence.267 Thus, exclusion
of the evidence in an appropriate case remains the surest way of main-
taining the integrity of the truth-seeking process. The following sections
257. FED. R. EvID. 403.
258. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 649; Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505; Smith, 454 F.2d at 157.
259. See Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting
qualitative difference between EEOC cause determination and EEOC letter of violation). See
also supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text for an explanation of the "litigation worthy"
standard.
260. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505.
261. Smith, 454 F.2d at 145.
262. Mitchell, 805 F.2d at 847; Smith, 454 F.2d at 157.
263. Hilton v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 624 F.2d 379, 383 (1st Cir. 1980); accord Smith v.
Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 877 F.2d 1106, 1113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 406
(1989); see also Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d at 247 (EEOC investigation not in bad faith or
frivolous, but proceeded in an unreasonable way and without foundation).
264. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651; Note, supra note 214, at 975.
265. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651; Gillin, 479 F.2d at 99.
266. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note; see Abrams, 702 F. Supp. at 512 (EEOC
determination admissible because limiting instruction will ensure jury does not deem it disposi-
tive); Strickland v. American Can Co., 575 F. Supp. 1111, 1112 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (EEOC
determinations admissible but court will issue jury instruction "to aid in the proper evaluation
of that determination letter.").
267. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132 n.8 (1968); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 186, § 59, at 151-52.
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set forth the primary factors a judge may review in deciding whether to
exclude an EEOC determination from jury consideration.
a. unfair prejudice and confusing or misleading the jury
Evidence is not considered unfairly prejudicial merely because it is
damaging to one of the parties.268 Rather, unfair prejudice means the
evidence has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."'2 69 A po-
tential worry, particularly for defendant employers, is that jurors may
sympathize with an employee's complaint. Thus, an EEOC determina-
tion that reasonable cause exists to believe the charge of discrimination is
true may coincide with jurors' own biases and receive more weight than
it deserves.27°
Another concern is that jurors might feel bound to place more
weight on an EEOC determination, an official opinion about the charge,
than on their own analysis of the facts.27 Jurors are sometimes swayed
by conclusions endorsed by the government, especially when the conclu-
sions are in writing.2 72 Official reports tend to lull jurors into believing
that the government's conclusions are correct or, at least, worthy of great
deference.2 73 Prejudice to one of the parties may arise where the jury
adopts the conclusions of the EEOC, rather than making an independent
assessment of the facts.2 74 This may especially be a problem if the jury's
ability to make such an assessment is limited by the unavailability of
witnesses or an incomplete or inaccurate EEOC report.
Determinations rendered after only an ex parte investigation 2. by
268. Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 461; McClure, 750 F.2d at 400; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 186, § 185, at 545.
269. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
270. Lewis, supra note 14, at 842.
271. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309. In Johnson, the complete EEOC determination was com-
posed of only two sentences: "Evidence of record fails to reflect that Charging Party was
counseled and/or warned about his poor job performance and attitude. However, the record
shows that similarly situated white employees were counseled and/or warned on numerous
occasions prior to their discharge." Id. The court maintained that the determination had little
probative value, and might prejudice the jury. Id.
272. Note, supra note 214, at 978; see, e.g., Fowler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 92
F.R.D. 1, 2 (1980) (administrative finding excluded pursuant to Rule 403 because its probative
value was outweighed by danger that its "official" nature would unduly prejudice or mislead
jury).
273. Note, supra note 214, at 978.
274. Note, The Trustworthiness of Government Evaluative Reports Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8)(C), 96 HARv. L. REv. 492, 495 (1982); Note, supra note 214, at 978.
275. An ex parte investigation is an investigation conducted about a person who is not
personally contacted or questioned. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979).
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the EEOC have been excluded from jury consideration, for fear a jury
may be unfairly influenced by a determination based on a one-sided as-
sessment of the facts.276 Additionally, highly conclusory EEOC determi-
nations have been excluded on the ground of unfair prejudice.277
Conclusory statements regarding the merit of a charge of employment
discrimination have little probative value because they provide virtually
no insight into the basis for the findings.278 Without in-court testimony
by the investigating EEOC official, jurors are left to speculate on the
ambiguities.
In certain cases a judge may believe the jury is ill-equipped to prop-
erly assess the probative weight of an EEOC determination, notwith-
standing a limiting instruction.2 79 The determination may confuse
jurors, for example, if it includes a lot of statistical data on employment
discrimination patterns or EEOC jargon.280 Or, an EEOC determination
may be misleading if, given its official nature, jurors regard it as conclu-
sive rather than preliminary evidence of a Title VII violation.28' Indeed,
jurors are generally less aware than judges of the "limits and vagaries of
administrative determinations. 2 82 The fear, then, is that jurors might
ignore disputed facts or will draw unwarranted inferences from proffered
evidence.283
276. Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir. 1977).
277. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1105-06 (8th Cir. 1988); Johnson, 734
F.2d at 1309.
278. Estes, 856 F.2d at 1105.
279. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 186, § 185, at 546. Professor Gold has noted
that "the courts fail to make much of a distinction among the 'dangers' of prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues and misleading the jury. They often discuss both confusion of the issues and
misleading the jury in terms of prejudice." Gold, supra note 30, at 500 n.16.
280. Gilfin, 479 F.2d at 99 (EEOC report "is a mishmash of self-serving and hearsay state-
ments and records which contain conflicting opinions, comments and inferences drawn by
investigators, potential witnesses, and unidentified persons. This maze of material would
thwart rather than ease the trier's efforts.").
281. See Gold, supra note 29, at 506 ("Inferential error... occurs when the jury decides
that evidence is more or less probative of a fact or event than it is.").
282. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651; accord Hilton, 624 F.2d at 383 judge in bench trial found
EEOC determination to be replete with "untruths, or only partial truths" and so refused to
accept it as probative evidence). But see City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915
(2d Cir. 1981) (not error to exclude government finding because government reports are
presented to jurors with an "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness" even when they are
incomplete and lack reliability); Gentile, 129 F.R.D. at 461 (state investigative report admissi-
ble because jurors were skeptical and self-reliant and unlikely to give undue deference to state
commissioners).
283. Lewis, supra note 14, at 844.
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b. undue trial delay
Evaluative official documents are, of course, "subject to the ultimate
safeguard-the opponent's right to present evidence tending to contra-
dict or diminish the weight of those conclusions." '284 When the time it
takes to explain or refute a piece of evidence substantially outweighs its
probative value, however, a judge has discretion to exclude the evi-
dence.285 The time-consumption factor has been described as "the fun-
damental reason to exclude relevant evidence. ' 286  Nevertheless,
probative evidence is generally not excluded solely on the grounds of un-
due trial delay or inefficiency.2" 7
Admitting an EEOC determination may unduly lengthen a trial be-
cause the party objecting to its introduction will have to spend time ex-
posing the weaknesses of the underlying EEOC investigation. 28 EEOC
investigation documents will have to be introduced and explained to the
jury. Witnesses will have to be called to testify as to both the EEOC's
investigatory standards and the alleged lack of compliance with those
standards. The presumption that an investigating official is competent
may be difficult and time-consuming to rebut.289 This added trial time
may be too costly when weighed against the limited probative evidentiary
value of a substandard EEOC determination. 290
The expenditure of time, however, is not a court's sole concern when
considering whether to allow rebuttal. Ironically, an objecting party's
attempt to discredit an EEOC investigation may add weight to the value
of an EEOC determination in the eyes of a jury. In such instances, a jury
may focus on the EEOC's prior investigative conduct rather than on the
facts as presented in the courtroom. 291 A jury which becomes persuaded
that the investigation was adequately conducted may give more credence
to the EEOC's preliminary conclusion than the determination deserves.
This reaction would detract from the de novo character of the trial.
284. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 168.
285. FED. R. EVID. 403.
286. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 186, § 185, at 546 n.34.
287. Lewis, supra note 14, at 853.
288. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309.
289. Note, supra note 274, at 495.
290. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309; see Pullman, 662 F.2d at 915.
291. Lewis, supra note 14, at 852.
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IV. SHOULD JUDGES HAVE DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE EEOC
DETERMINATIONS FROM JURIES BASED ON FEDERAL RULE
OF EVIDENCE 403?
A. The Circuit Split
The circuit courts are in conflict over whether judges should have
discretion to apply the evidence code's balancing test to exclude EEOC
cause determinations from juries.29 2 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits take
the view that EEOC determinations are so probative that their relevance
to the charge of employment discrimination can never be outweighed by
the concerns of unfair prejudice, confusing or misleading a jury or undue
trial delay.293 These two circuits essentially refuse to apply the balancing
test on a case-by-case basis in the employment discrimination context.
Consequently, this view has become known as the per se rule of
admissibility.
294
In contrast, the First, Third, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits allow
judges the discretion to apply the balancing test independently in each
case.29 5 Their rationale is that neither EEOC determinations, nor the
investigations upon which the findings are based, are consistently of ade-
quate quality.2 9 6 These courts recognize that at times the probative value
of an EEOC determination may be slight.297 Weighed against the danger
that juries may be swayed or confused by the conclusions of an official
agency, or by the time it may take to expose the investigation's weak-
nesses, these courts allow trial judges to decide whether the determina-
tion merits jury consideration.
1. The per se admissible view
Although EEOC findings on reasonable cause were initially consid-
ered per se admissible only in Title VII bench trials, 298 the Fifth and
292. See Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 509, 512 (D.N.J. 1988) (noting circuit
court conflict).
293. McClure v. Mexia Indep. School Dist., 750 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1985); Plummer v.
Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981).
294. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
295. Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-
6501 (U.S. filed Dec. 11, 1990); Smith v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 877 F.2d 1106 (1st
Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 406 (1989); Briseno v. Central Technical Community College
Area, 739 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 734 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1041 (1984); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1977); Angelo
v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1977).
296. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309.
297. Id.
298. See, eg., Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978) (EEOC's cause
determination admissible in de novo bench trial); Smith v. Universal Servs., 454 F.2d 154 (5th
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Ninth Circuits have extended this rule to employment discrimination
cases heard by juries.2 99 While the Fifth Circuit explicitly recognizes
that public documents may be excluded for untrustworthiness, it refuses
to exclude EEOC determinations based upon the balancing test.3"° The
Ninth Circuit, taking an apparently more extreme position, implied that
under no circumstance may a judge have discretion to exclude an EEOC
determination.3"' Recently, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that this lat-
ter view foreclosed even untrustworthiness exclusions,3 "2 although
whether the Ninth Circuit intended this broad interpretation remains to
be seen.30 3
a. the Ninth Circuit view
The Ninth Circuit was the first to conclude that an EEOC determi-
nation may not be excluded from a jury on balancing test grounds. In
Plummer v. Western International Hotels Co.,3o an employee filed suit
under both Title VII and section 1981, alleging racial discrimination in
passing over her for a promotion.30 5 The EEOC's investigation revealed
a finding of reasonable cause to believe the employee's charges were
true.30 6 The employee sought to introduce the EEOC's reasonable cause
determination as evidence of discrimination.30 7 The trial court, without
specifying a reason, excluded the determination from jury considera-
Cir. 1972) (en bane) (probative value of EEOC reports outweigh any possible prejudice). But
see Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori School, Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 153-54 (7th Cir. 1985) (judge
may factor unfair prejudice and time required to expose EEOC report weaknesses into decision
whether to exclude report in Title VII case); Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir.
1972) (decision to exclude EEOC report in Title VII case within sound discretion of trial
court).
299. One federal court stated it was following the Plummer rule of per se admissibility.
Abrams, 702 F. Supp. at 512. Yet the court also noted it "might choose to exclude EEOC
letters of determination... in cases where the administrative decision is shown to be particu-
larly untrustworthy." Id. As this Comment discusses at supra note 201, it is unclear whether
the Ninth Circuit recognizes the untrustworthiness exception of 803(8)(C). Arguably, then,
the Abrams court is not adhering to as rigid a rule as the Plummer reference suggests.
300. McClure, 750 F.2d at 400.
301. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505.
302. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 650.
303. The United States Supreme Court, in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, expressly ac-
knowledged that public documents may be excluded on the ground of untrustworthiness. 448
U.S. 153, 167-68 (1988). Consequently, even if the Ninth Circuit intended to foreclose a trust-
worthiness inquiry into EEOC determinations, it would appear invalid.
304. 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981).
305. Id. at 502.
306. Id. at 503.
307. Id. at 504.
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tion. 08 The employee subsequently lost on both causes of action.3°9
The appeals court reversed, holding that the reasonable cause deter-
mination should have been admitted.310 The court acknowledged that
the per se rule of admitting EEOC determinations previously had been
applied only in bench trials. 31' Consequently, it offered several reasons
to support an extension of the rule to the jury setting. First, EEOC in-
vestigations are generally conducted by "professional investigators on be-
half of an impartial agency. "'32 Any deficiencies in the accuracy of the
findings, the court maintained, may be presented to the jury by the em-
ployer.31 3 The court failed to consider, however, whether defects in the
findings might cause unfair prejudice to the parties. For example, defi-
ciencies in EEOC investigations may not be obvious from the face of a
determination, or the investigators may not be available as witnesses.
Thus, absent exclusion of the evidence, the potential for prejudice might
go unchecked. The court also ignored the issue of whether presentation
of deficiencies in an EEOC investigation might unduly lengthen the trial.
Additionally, the court failed to recognize that inquiry into the conduct
of an EEOC investigation may expose those employees who assisted the
EEOC to retaliation by the accused employer.31 4
Next, rejecting the employer's contention that a jury might become
confused over the proper weight to assign the report,315 the court held
there is no reason to keep an EEOC determination from a jury as it is
"not only admissible, but... highly probative" evidence.31 6 Yet the fact
that an EEOC determination is not a conclusive finding on whether a
Title VII violation has occurred should weigh against its probative
value.3 17 Moreover, merely because evidence is probative does not mean
308. Id. at 503.
309. Id. at 504.
310. Id. at 506.
311. Id. at 505.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 505 n.9.
314. S. SHULMAN & C. ABERNATHY, supra note 50, § 12.2.4.
315. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 504.
316. Id. at 505.
317. Although the Plummer court justified its per se rule by emphasizing the probative
value of EEOC determinations, the Ninth Circuit maintained in another case that a determina-
tion "does not suggest to the jury that the EEOC has already determined that there has been a
violation. Rather, it suggests that preliminarily there is reason to believe a violation has taken
place." Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir. 1986). The Gilchrist
court maintained that this distinction between "preliminary" and "conclusive" EEOC findings
might affect the tendency of the evidence to unduly prejudice the jury. Id. Conclusive find-
ings, the court held, will increase the possibility of unfair prejudice because jurors will have a
more difficult time making an independent evaluation of the charge. Id. Yet the court ignored
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it is free from potentially prejudicial attributes. Indeed, the Rule 403
balancing test is triggered only after an initial assessment by a trial judge
that the proffered evidence has probative value.318
Finally, the court believed that hinging admissibility on the distinc-
tion between a bench and jury trial would waste the value of the EEOC
investigation whenever an employee filed both section 1981 and Title VII
claims together.319 The court failed to recognize that it is precisely when
a jury is hearing a claim that proper application of the balancing test is
crucial.
In this way, the Ninth Circuit launched an unprecedented expansion
of the per se admissibility rule. The Plummer court virtually ignored
application of the balancing test to the facts of the case at hand. The
costs and benefits of admitting the evidence were never weighed. No at-
tempt was made to discern the reason why the trial court excluded the
EEOC determination. Instead, deference to the EEOC's general investi-
gative capabilities and ultimate findings became paramount in the deci-
sion to admit the evidence. The Ninth Circuit's unconventional
approach is particularly disturbing because it flouted the general rule
that evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion by the trial court.32
b. the Fifth Circuit view
The per se rule was further developed, and distinguished from the
untrustworthiness exception, in McClure v. Mexia Independent School
District.321 In McClure, the Fifth Circuit decided that a trial judge has
discretion to exclude an EEOC determination from a jury only when
"'the sources of information or other circumstances indicate the lack of
trustworthiness.' ,322 The plaintiff in McClure was discharged from her
position as bookkeeper/office manager a few months after she filed a sex
discrimination charge with the EEOC. 323 The school district contended
the logical extrapolation of its contention: a preliminary finding may be less likely to induce
unfair prejudice than a conclusive finding, but it will also have less probative value. Thus,
there is a sound argument for application of the Rule 403 balancing test on a case-by-case basis
notwithstanding the preliminary nature of an EEOC determination.
318. Gold, supra note 30, at 498 n.9.
319. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505.
320. Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Board of Police
Comm'rs, 844 F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1092 (1989); United States
v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983); Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morrell & Co., 633 F.2d
1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1980).
321. 750 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1985).
322. Id. at 400 (quoting FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(C)).
323. Id. at 397-98. The school district classified plaintiff's position as "Aide III" rather
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that the employee's position was eliminated as part of an administrative
reorganization,324 but plaintiff filed suit for retaliatory discharge under
both Title VII and section 1983.325 Finding the discharge retaliatory, the
jury awarded plaintiff section 1983 damages, and the court awarded
plaintiff reinstatement and attorney's fees pursuant to Title VII.326
One of the primary issues on appeal was whether the district court
erroneously admitted the EEOC determination of reasonable cause for
retaliatory discharge.327 In admitting the report, the district court had
relied on the reasoning 328 of an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, Smith v.
Universal Services.329 The Smith court concluded that an EEOC deter-
mination on reasonable cause may not be excluded on the ground of un-
fair prejudice given its high probative value.330 Although recognizing
that Smith was decided in a non-jury setting, the McCure district court
maintained that the reasoning applies equally well in jury cases.331
The employer's contention, on appeal, was that the district court
judge's reliance on Smith established a per se rule of admissibility and
foreclosed an untrustworthiness objection.332 The employer maintained
this was error because the evidence code specifically recognizes that pub-
lic records may be excluded if found to be untrustworthy.333 The Fifth
Circuit rejected the employer's interpretation of the district court judg-
ment and affirmed the admissibility of the EEOC determination.334
The court confirmed that there are two distinct means of challeng-
ing the introduction of an EEOC finding of reasonable cause: (1) the
sources of information upon which the determination is based or other
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness; 335 and (2) the probative
than as business manager. Id. at 397. The annual salary was $7,800 for the Aide III position
and $9,600 for the business manager position. Id. Plaintiff alleged this classification was moti-
vated by sex discrimination, and she filed a complaint with the EEOC. Id. at 397-98.
324. Id. at 398.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. The EEOC issued two findings that there was reasonable cause to believe the em-
ployee's charges were true. The first pertained to plaintiff's initial charge that the school dis-
trict's job classification was motivated by sex discrimination. Id. The second, which formed
the basis of the employer's appeal, focused on the retaliatory discharge allegation. Id.
328. Id. at 400.
329. 454 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972).
330. Id. at 157.
331. McClure, 750 F.2d at 400.
332. Id. at 401.
333. Id. at 400-01.
334. Id. at 401.
335. Id. at 400. This challenge may be raised pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
[Vol. 24:707
EXCLUDING EEOC DETERMINATIONS
value of the report is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.336
The court refused to foreclose the first type of challenge.337 It rejected
the employer's argument that adoption of the Smith reasoning precluded
an untrustworthiness challenge, because Smith was decided prior to the
adoption of this express ground for exclusion under the evidence code.338
The district court's admission of the EEOC determination was proper,
the Fifth Circuit concluded, because the employer failed to raise the un-
trustworthiness issue until the appeals stage.339
As to the second type of challenge, the court followed the lead of the
Ninth Circuit and held that the high probative value of an EEOC deter-
uination will outweigh "any possible prejudice.",340 The court, without
discussing the potential for undue trial delay, maintained that litigants
may refute the evidence by exposing any defects in an EEOC determina-
tion to the jury.34'
2. The view allowing judicial discretion to exclude
EEOC determinations
Although several circuits follow the view allowing trial judges dis-
cretion to exclude EEOC determinations on "balancing test" grounds,
only the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have considered the issue in any
depth. The next two sections set forth the reasoning these circuits use to
reject the per se rule of admissibility.
a the Eighth Circuit view
The Eighth Circuit first faced the issue of whether judges should
have discretion to exclude EEOC determinations from juries in Johnson
v. Yellow Freight System. 42 The plaintiff, who was discharged for alleg-
edly failing to adequately perform his job, filed a charge of racial discrim-
ination against his employer with the EEOC.3 43 After the EEOC issued
a determination that reasonable cause existed to believe the discrimina-
tion charge was true, the employee filed suit in federal court pursuant to
Title VII and section 1981.144 The employee received a jury trial on the
336. McClure, 750 F.2d at 400. This challenge may be raised pursuant to FED. R. EVID.
403.
337. McClure, 750 F.2d at 400.
338. Id. at 399.
339. Id. at 401.
340. Id. at 400.
341. Id.
342. 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1041 (1984).
343. Id. at 1306.
344. Id. at 1306-07.
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section 1981 claim, but lost the suit on both counts.345
On appeal, the employee contended that the trial judge erred in fail-
ing to admit the EEOC determination as evidence to support the section
1981 claim, when it had been admitted for the Title VII claim.346 The
court rejected the employee's contention, holding that the trial judge
properly exercised discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403347 to
exclude the EEOC determination from the jury.348
Two factors appeared to guide the court's decision on this issue.
First, recognizing that EEOC determinations vary in quality and detail,
the court stated that a per se rule of admissibility would "shackle the
discretion of trial judges" who should consider potential prejudice and
trial delay.34 9 Second, the EEOC determination at issue in the case was
"highly conclusory" and only minimally probative on the issue of em-
ployment discrimination.350 The court felt that introducing the determi-
nation might sway the jury from reaching its own conclusions regarding
the claim.351 Moreover, the minimal value of introducing the determina-
tion did not merit the extra time it would take to explain the scope of the
EEOC investigation to the jury.35 2
In Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area,353 the
Eighth Circuit demonstrated that employees may also benefit from a
case-by-case application of. the balancing test. The plaintiff in Briseno, a
part-time college instructor, filed suit under Title VII and section 1981
for discharge based on racial discrimination. 3 4 After investigating the
charge, the EEOC issued a determination that no reasonable cause ex-
isted to believe discrimination was the reason for the discharge.35 The
district court excluded the determination from the jury, and the em-
ployee ultimately received an award of back pay, reinstatement and at-
torney's fees.356
On appeal, the employer argued that the EEOC determination was
improperly excluded by the trial judge.357 The court rejected this con-
345. Id. at 1306.
346. Id. at 1308 & n.1.
347. FED. R. EVID. 403.
348. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309-10.
349. Id. at 1309.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 1309-10.
353. 739 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1984).
354. Id. at 346.
355. Id. at 347.
356. Id. at 346-47.
357. Id. at 347.
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tention, concluding that Johnson had established that admitting an
EEOC determination is a discretionary decision left to the trial judge.
358
The employee's award was slightly modified, but affirmed in
substance.359
Thus, unlike either the Fifth or Ninth Circuit decisions on this evi-
dentiary issue, the Johnson and Briseno courts analyzed the propriety of
allowing discretion on both general and specific grounds. After refusing
to accept the proposition that all EEOC determinations are highly proba-
tive, both courts looked to the particular determination offered as evi-
dence in the case before them. This tailored application of the balancing
test seems more in keeping with the objectives of a trial de novo. As is
also evident by the Johnson and Briseno results, both employers and em-
ployees potentially stand to benefit from a more individualized applica-
tion of the balancing test.
b. the Eleventh Circuit view
Just recently, in Barfield v. Orange County,36° the Eleventh Circuit
decided that the issue of whether to exclude EEOC determinations on
reasonable cause from juries should be left to trial judges.361 In so hold-
ing, the court joined the First,36 2 Third363 and Eighth Circuits3 4 which
also accord trial judges complete discretion. In addition, the Barfield
court took this opportunity to consider and expressly reject both the
Fifth 365 and Ninth Circuit 366 approaches.
The employee in Barfield filed suit under Title VII and sections
1981 and 1983, alleging that she was discharged from her position as a
corrections officer with the county sheriff on account of her race and
sex.367 The EEOC's investigation of these charges resulted in a finding of
no cause to believe the discharge stemmed from discrimination.3 68 The
trial judge refused to exclude the determination from the jury.3 69 The
358. Id.
359. Id. at 348.
360. 911 F.2d 644 (1th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-6501 (U.S. fied Dec. 11, 1990).
361. Id. at 650-51.
362. Smith, 877 F.2d at 1113.
363. Walton, 563 F.2d at 74-75; Angelo, 555 F.2d at 1176.
364. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988); Briseno, 739 F.2d
at 347; Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309.
365. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 650.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 649.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 651.
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employee lost the suit in its entirety.3 70
On appeal, the employee claimed that the trial judge erred in deny-
ing her motion in limine to exclude the EEOC determination. 17' The
motion had requested exclusion on the grounds of hearsay, undue preju-
dice, trial delay and because the determination was only minimally pro-
bative on the issue of employment discrimination.3 72 After extensively
reviewing the various circuit court decisions on this evidentiary question,
and analyzing the employee's motion to exclude the evidence, the court
affirmed the trial judge's decision to admit the determination.373
The court agreed that EEOC determinations may be highly proba-
tive.374 Yet it departed from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' approach by
also recognizing that determinations are, of varying quality.375 As such,
the court contended that admitting an official determination on a per se
basis may at times create the danger of unfair prejudice in the minds of
jurors. 6 The court stressed that "the change from a bench to a jury
trial may very well affect the analysis under Rule 403."'37 Deciding that
trial judges must have the discretion to weigh the costs and benefits of
admitting an EEOC determination in a given case, the court flatly re-
jected the per se rule of admissibility.378
As to the employee's specific argument that the trial judge erred in
admitting the no cause determination, however, the court balked. The
employee's motion to exclude the evidence under Rule 403 was "con-
clusory," and she failed to raise an untrustworthiness objection. 379 The
employee argued that the EEOC only contacted management during its
investigation, but the court, after reviewing all of the EEOC records,
found that both parties were asked to submit information on the
charge.380 Consequently, the employee's evidentiary challenges failed.38'
Unlike several of the other cases construing this issue, the Barfield
court ultimately admitted the determination based on an application of
the balancing test. Yet by reaching its decision after a thorough review
of the costs and benefits of admitting the proffered evidence, the court
370. Id.
371. Id. at 649.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 651.
374. Id. at 649.
375. Id. at 650.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 651.
378. Id. at 650-51.
379. Id. at 651.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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rendered a judgment tailored to the facts of the case. The employee,
although disgruntled with the result, at least should realize that her ob-
jections to introduction of the evidence were fully heard and considered.
B. The Rationale for Allowing Judicial Discretion to Exclude EEOC
Determinations Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403
1. Policy underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence
The "search for truth and justice" '382 in litigation is an overriding
policy concern of the Federal Rules of Evidence.3"3 This policy objective
is promoted, in large part, by application of the Rule 403 balancing
test.384 Rule 403 is essentially a means of regulating the flow of informa-
tion to the jury.385 It is "'a rule of exclusion that cuts across [all] the
rules of evidence.' "36 By according a judge discretion to exclude from a
jury evidence which is less probative than prejudicial, misleading or con-
fusing, the truth-seeking process is enhanced.387
The primary inquiry under Rule 403 is whether a jury'S considera-
tion of proffered evidence will "enhance or detract from accurate fact
finding." 3 8  It is the trial judge's responsibility to make this determina-
tion.38 9 The rationale for allowing a trial judge discretion to exclude evi-
dence under the balancing test is that the judge "is in a superior position
to evaluate all of the circumstances connected with [the competing inter-
ests of the parties], 'since he [or she] sees the witnesses, defendant, jurors,
and counsel, and their mannerisms and reactions.' "390 When a trial
382. Leonard, supra note 20, at 4; Lewis, supra note 14, at 290.
383. Lewis, supra note 14, at 290.
384. Leonard, supra note 20, at 12; Lewis, supra note 14, at 291; see also Gold, supra note
12, at 67 ("[B]oth truth and fairness share a similar meaning in [the evidentiary] context:
rendition of verdicts by an unbiased jury based upon the logical implications of the evidence.").
385. Tanford, A Political-choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J.
831, 831 (1989).
386. Jones v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 844 F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Shows
v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1092 (1989);
accord Lewis, supra note 14, at 291 n.6 ("The only exceptions to Rule 403 coverage are found
in Rules 412 and 609.").
387. Gold, supra note 12, at 67; Leonard, supra note 20, at 12.
388. Gold, supra note 12, at 67.
389. Tanford, supra note 385, at 832.
390. United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978)). One
commentator suggests that trial judges are in a position to assess jury reaction to a particular
piece of evidence for three reasons: (1) trial judges have general experience viewing jury reac-
tion to the type of evidence under consideration; (2) trial judges are aware of the jurors' back-
grounds and so may be sensitive to their likely reactions in the particular case; and (3) trial
judges may consider the specific context in which the evidence is offered. Gold, supra note 12,
at 69. Nevertheless, there is concern that judges are biased when evaluating the introduction
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judge is prevented from exercising this discretion, Rule 403 is reduced to
a nullity.
391
The per se rule of admitting EEOC determinations blatantly ignores
the balancing test as contemplated by Rule 403.392 The balancing test
specifically allows the exclusion of relevant evidence under certain cir-
cumstances.393 Therefore, whether the evidence is generally probative is
only a threshold question.394 Rule 403 demands, in addition, that a
judge weigh the costs and benefits of admitting the evidence in the case at
hand.395 It may be that the EEOC determination is conclusory,396 or
that the investigation was inadequate,397 or that the time it would take to
expose the weaknesses in the determination is prohibitive,398 or that the
jurors may be inappropriately swayed by the official nature of the deter-
ruination.3 99 Indeed, these scenarios have all arisen during the trials of
employment discrimination claims. The per se rule of admissibility sim-
ply fails to account for these potential concerns. Rather, it relegates Rule
403 to "a redundant relevance requirement," thereby undermining the
truth-seeking process.4' °
Additionally, there is simply no good reason to "shackle the discre-
tion of trial judges with a rule of per se admissibility"" of EEOC deter-
minations. Rule 403 is not an unlimited grant of authority allowing trial
of evidence. Tanford, supra note 385, at 832-33 ('judges in reality make [evidentiary] deci-
sions consistent with their political orientation").
391. Gold, supra note 12, at 93-94.
392. See id.
393. FED. R. EVID. 403 & advisory committee's note.
394. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 186, § 185, at 544.
395. Id.
396. Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1041 (1984).
397. Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 651 (11th Cir.) (EEOC determination of no
reasonable cause admitted even though employee claimed investigator only reviewed informa-
tion submitted by employer), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-6501 (U.S. filed Dec. 11, 1990);
EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1099 (6th Cir. 1984) (magistrate recommended sum-
mary judgment for employer because EEOC investigation was composed only of reviewing
employer's affirmative action guidelines prior to issuing determination that cause existed for
discrimination charge); Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir.
1977) (EEOC determination based on only ex parte investigation of discrimination charge
excluded); EEOC v. King's Daughters Hosp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 484,489-90 (D.
Miss. 1976) (summary judgment granted to employer where EEOC failed to investigate
whether job applicant was qualified for position applied for).
398. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 13-09; City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d
Cir. 1981).
399. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 650-51.
400. Gold, supra note 12, at 94.
401. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309.
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judges to exclude evidence at the slightest provocation. °2 Rather,
proper application of Rule 403 requires first a preliminary detection of
some form of unfair prejudice or other enumerated danger." 3 Next, the
probative value of the proffered evidence must be established.' Finally,
only if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential
for unfair prejudice will the evidence be excluded. 4" This is not an easy
burden for the objecting party to meet, in part because the Federal Rules
of Evidence were drafted to favor the admissibility of evidence." 6
2. Fairness to the parties
According trial judges discretion to exclude EEOC determinations
when appropriate under the balancing test will promote fairness in the
litigation process." 7 Although the concept of fairness is somewhat am-
biguous," it has been identified as including the meaningful opportunity
of a litigant to be heard' and the lack of bias in jury decision-making.41 0
Both of these concerns may be subverted by a per se admissibility rule if
conclusory or inadequately investigated EEOC determinations are ad-
mitted without regard to their effect on the parties at trial.
Providing victims of employment discrimination with a meaningful
opportunity to be heard was important to the Title VII drafters.4 ' In-
deed, Title VII specifically provides a litigant with the right to a federal
trial de novo,41 2 whether a claim is filed by an individual 13 or by the
EEOC.g14 By extending de novo review to Title VII claims, Congress
sought to provide an aggrieved employee with more than just an adminis-
402. Gold, supra note 30, at 500.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 498 n.9.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 497.
407. Gold, supra note 12, at 69.
408. Id.
409. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
410. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
411. During the legislative debates over passage of Title VII, it was established that:
A substantial number of committee members... [prefer] that the ultimate determi-
nation of discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary. Through this requirement,
we believe that settlement of complaints will occur more rapidly and with greater
frequency. In addition, we believe that the employer or labor union will have a fairer
forum to establish innocence since a trial de novo is required in district court pro-
ceedings together with the necessity of the Commission proving discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEws 2355, 2515-16.
412. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 861 (1976).
413. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988).
414. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
April 1991]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
trative forum for redress.415 Given this de novo approach, EEOC deter-
minations on cause are not binding on the trier of fact.416
This seemingly generous opportunity to be heard may be under-
mined, however, if evidence is admitted which may mislead, confuse or
foster bias in a jury.417 EEOC determinations on cause, official findings
on the charge of discrimination at issue before the jurors, may be particu-
larly influential.418 Rather than focusing on a fresh review of the facts as
presented in the courtroom, jurors may be tempted to adopt the EEOC's
interpretation of the case.419 As a result, the accuracy of a jury's fact
finding process may suffer, and fairness to the parties may be jeopard-
ized.42° These concerns, and the fact that EEOC determinations are in-
sulated from appellate review,42 militate against a per se rule of
admissibility.
The per se rule of admissibility also denies litigants the appearance
of fairness in the adjudication of their claims. If an employer or em-
ployee subjectively believes that the EEOC rendered an unfair determina-
tion, a court will be doing both litigants a disservice by requiring
admission of EEOC determinations on a per se basis. Trials are con-
ducted, after all, not only for the search for truth but also to allow citi-
zens their day in court.422 The rules of evidence serve to protect society's
belief in the legitimacy of the courtroom process.42 3 If the balancing test
is properly applied and the evidence is, nevertheless, admitted, the
objecting party is at least assured that the court reviewed the matter
according to the strictures of the evidence code.424 The per se rule of
415. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,47 (1974). The rationale for extending
federal de novo review is that federal judges are more likely to withstand political pressure
when enforcing the goal of equal employment opportunity. Chandler, 425 U.S. at 851-52. The
contention that judges are neutral decision-makers has been criticized. See Tanford, supra
note 385, at 838.
416. See, eg., Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1981) ("a
civil rights plaintiff has the right to a de novo trial in federal court, and while prior administra-
tive determinations are not binding, they are admissible evidence"); Georator Corp. v. EEOC,
592 F.2d 765, 768-69 (4th Cir. 1979) (EEOC findings on cause have no determinate conse-
quences and only carry "as much weight as the trial court ascribes to it").
417. Gold, supra note 12, at 71.
418. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651.
419. See Gold, supra note 12, at 71.
420. Id.
421. Note, supra note 274, at 499.
422. Leonard, supra note 20, at 39. Professor Leonard suggests that trials serve the cathar-
tic function of offering people an opportunity to present information in a satisfactory way so
that they will refrain from violence outside of the courtroom. Id. at 41. Catharsis is "an
emotional response, hinging on our sense of satisfaction with the processes of the court." Id.
423. Id.
424. See, eg., Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651 (trial judge's decision to admit EEOC determina-
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admissibility, in contrast, may leave the objecting party feeling
cheated.425
V. CONCLUSION
The experience in jurisdictions which give judges discretion to ex-
clude EEOC determinations based on the balancing test suggests that
overturning the per se admissibility rule will result in the exclusion of at
least some proffered determinations.426 In fact, EEOC determinations
were excluded from evidence pursuant to Rule 403 in five of the six main
circuit court cases discussed in this Comment.427 Of course, the burden
of convincing judges that the costs of admitting an EEOC determination
significantly outweigh its probative value ultimately remains with the ob-
jecting party.428 As the employee in Barfield v. Orange County 429 discov-
ered, a successful challenge may require more than a few conclusory
statements.43° Yet Chief Justice Marshall stated it best long ago: "a mo-
tion to the discretion of the ourt ... is a motion, not to its inclination,
but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal prin-
ciples. ' 43 1 Only when the balancing test of Rule 403 is applied to the
specific facts in each case, rather than on a per se basis, will the equal
tion affirmed, but only after appellate review of "lengthy EEOC fie" pursuant to employee's
Rule 403 objection).
425. See Georator Corp., 592 F.2d at 769. Responding to the employer's contention that
admitting an EEOC reasonable cause determination constitutes a violation of the opportunity
to be heard, the court noted that only in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are judges required to
admit the determinations without review. Id. Thus, the court implied, due process concerns
are vitiated when a judge has discretion to exclude an EEOC determination on balancing test
grounds. Id.
426. See, eg., Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1105-06 (8th Cir. 1988);
Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 1977); Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co.,
555 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir. 1977).
427. Estes, 856 F.2d at 1105-06; Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area,
739 F.2d 344, 347 (8th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309-10
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1041 (1984); Walton, 563 F.2d at 75; Angelo, 555 F.2d at
1176. Only in Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 650-51 (1lth Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, No. 90-6501 (U.S. fied Dec. 11, 1990), did the court admit the proffered EEOC determi-
nation after application of the Rule 403 balancing test.
428. Lewis, supra note 14, at 292-93.
429. 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1990).
430. Id. at 649. The court noted, "Itihe motion asserted in a purely conclusory manner that
the EEOC report was hearsay, that an EEOC report is of minimal probative value, and that its
admission would prolong the trial and unduly prejudice the plaintiff." Id.
431. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
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employment rights of litigants be best addressed and the integrity of the
legal system be enhanced.
Leslie Abbott*
* The author wishes to thank Professors Terry Coltingsworth and Victor J. Gold for
their editorial comments. Also, my love and thanks to Mark C. Calahan for his patience and
encouragement. This Comment is dedicated to Gregory B. Abbott, an inspiring lawyer and
terrific brother.
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